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TAKING STOCK—SALARY AND OPTIONS TOO:
THE LOOTING OF CORPORATE AMERICA
KENNETH R. DAVIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Executive compensation has come to mean corporate greed.
Too many managers appointed to protect the interests of sharehold-
ers are looting their companies.  CEO pay has soared to incomprehen-
sible levels.1  Even in 2008, a year of shriveling corporate profits and
Copyright  2010 by Kenneth R. Davis.
* Professor and Area Chair of Law and Ethics, Fordham University Graduate School
of Business; J.D., University of Toledo, School of Law, 1977; M.A., University of California,
Long Beach, 1971; B.A., State University of New York at Binghamton, 1969.  Without the
research support of my wife, Jean, who worked tirelessly on many a sunny weekend, I would
probably still be stuck on the first paragraph of the introduction.  Jean is the Nastia Liukin
of law librarians, a skillful and agile researcher who turns somersaults around all the
others.
1. See Matt Ericson & Alan McLean, The Pay at the Top, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2009, at BU9
(reporting data compiled by Equilar, a research firm that tracks executive and director
compensation, comparing 2007 and 2008 executive compensation figures for CEOs of
prominent U.S. companies); Kathryn Jones, Who Moved My Bonus?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5,
2009, at BU1 (reporting that, until 2008, executive compensation had risen almost every
year since the burst of the tech bubble in 2001–2002); Matteo Tonello, The Role of the Board
in Turbulent Times . . . Overseeing Risk Management and Executive Compensation: “Pressure
Points” for Corporate Directors 5 (The Conference Bd., Executive Action Series No. 292,
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1325028 (noting that “recent studies docu-
ment that in the last two decades executive compensation has grown substantially faster
than corporate earnings” and citing an analysis of the Wall Street Journal and ERI Economic
Research Institute showing that in 2007, the median salary of the top executive of a Standard
and Poor’s 500 company rose 20.5%); cf. Nuno Fernandes et al., The Pay Divide: (Why) Are
U.S. Top Executives Paid More? 24–25 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper
No. 255/2009, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1341639 (summarizing evi-
419
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plummeting stock prices, more CEOs saw pay increases than cuts.2
Despite the ravages of the financial crisis, average CEO pay in 2008
declined only modestly.3  The recession did not stop struggling com-
panies from handing bloated pay packages to top executives.  One of
the highest paid CEOs in the United States was Sanjay Jha.4  Mr. Jha,
who runs Motorola, made $104.4 million in 2008.5  A 71% decline in
dence that U.S. executives receive more pay than their European and Asian counterparts,
even after controlling for a wide spectrum of firm, industry, governance, and CEO
characteristics).
2. Kim Dixon, More “US” CEOs Got Pay Hikes than Cuts in ’08, REUTERS, Apr. 14, 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE53D43N20090414 (reporting a study conducted
by the AFL-CIO of 946 companies in the Russell 3000 index showing that 480 CEOs—more
than half—received raises in 2008); see also Stephen Bernard, Citi Boosting Salaries to Offset
Lower Bonuses, WASH. TIMES, June 24, 2009, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2009/jun/24/citi-boosting-salaries-offset-lower-bonuses (reporting that Citigroup,
Inc., has raised the salaries of many of its employees to offset bonus reductions and to
ensure that their compensation will not decline in 2009). But see Joann S. Lublin, CEO Pay
Sinks Along with Profits, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 2009, at A1 (noting that the median CEO com-
pensation for 200 companies with over $5 billion in annual revenue fell 3.4% in 2008,
which was only the second annual decrease in executive pay since 1989).
3. See ALLEN JACKSON & BEN STRADLEY, TOWERS PERRIN, 2009 PROXY STATEMENTS HIGH-
LIGHT THE NEW REALITIES IN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 1–2 (2009), http://www.towersper-
rin.com/tp/getwebcachedoc?webc=USA/2009/200904/April_7__New_Realities_in_EC.
pdf (describing a report by Towers Perrin showing that in 2008, despite the financial
meltdown, the total direct compensation to CEOs of almost 200 of the Fortune 500 compa-
nies decreased only 2%).  Data compiled by Equilar shows that for companies that filed
their proxy statements by March 27 and had minimum revenues of $6.3 billion, average
executive pay fell 5.1% in 2008, which was not as steep of a decline as the fall in share-
holder values.  Jones, supra note 1.  Even while the recession battered corporate profits and R
shareholder return, the average total compensation among CEOs at these companies in
2008 was $10.9 million.  AFL-CIO, 2008 Trends in CEO Pay, http://www.aflcio.org/
corporatewatch/paywatch/pay/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).  Executives of some
of the most financially troubled investment houses were impervious to the fury of the fi-
nancial crisis.  Merrill Lynch paid eleven of its top executives more than $10 million in
2008, and it paid at least $3 million to an additional 149 employees.  Susanne Craig, Mer-
rill’s $10 Million Men: Top 10 Earners Made $209 Million in 2008 as Firm Foundered, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 4, 2009, at A1.  The median compensation of directors at 300 of the Fortune 500
companies tilted upward during the financial crisis, increasing 4.7% from 2007 to 2008.
Press Release, Equilar, Non-Employee Director Pay Climbs 4.7% to $182K (May 5, 2009),
available at http://equilar.com/press_20090505_1.php.  Corporate counsel for major com-
panies are also bathing in cash.  For example, Jon Walton, counsel for Allegheny Technol-
ogies, Inc., reaped a total compensation package of $8,133,733 in 2007.  Law.com,
Corporate Counsel’s 2008 GC Compensation Survey, http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubAr-
ticleCC.jsp?id=1202423065928 (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).  Gary Lynch, counsel for belea-
guered Morgan Stanley, received a stunning discretionary bonus of more than $6.3
million. Id.  Mark Bobak of Anheuser-Busch Companies, Inc., raked in an option award of
$5,291,139. Id.
4. Ericson & McLean, supra note 1 (noting that Mr. Jha was the highest paid CEO out R
of 200 chief executives at 198 public companies that filed their annual proxies by March 27
and had revenue of at least $6.3 billion in 2008).
5. Id.
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shareholder value did not deter the company from providing its CEO
with this enormous sum.6  Walt Disney paid its CEO, Robert Iger,
$51.1 million in 2008, which is nearly double the $27.7 million it paid
him in 2007.7  This generous pay hike seemed particularly striking in a
year when Disney’s profits sank 5%.8  Kenneth Chenault, who heads
American Express (“AMEX”), took a pay cut from $50.1 million in
2007 to a mere $42.8 million in 2008.9  This 14.6% reduction did not
come close to matching the 29% plunge in AMEX’s profits.10
Public resentment over multimillion dollar paychecks swelled to
outrage when American International Group (“AIG”) threw satchels
of taxpayer bailout funds at its managers.11  The rhetoric became in-
flammatory.  An enraged Charles Grassley, the ranking Republican of
the Senate Finance Committee, declared that AIG employees who
took taxpayer money should “‘follow the Japanese model and come
before the American people and take that deep bow and say I’m sorry,
and then either do one of two things—resign, or go commit sui-
cide.’”12  President Obama, who was more circumspect, called the bo-
6. Id. Shareholder value, reported as “Total Return,” assumes the reinvestment of
dividends.  Matt Ericson & Alan McLean, How the Pay Figures Were Calculated, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 5, 2009, at BU9.




11. See Greg Hitt & Aaron Lucchetti, House Passes Bonus Tax Bill: 90% Hit Would Affect
Major Banks; Senate Mulls Similar Action Amid AIG Furor, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2009, at A1
(reporting the “popular outrage” over the AIG payouts); Dr. John E. Murray, Jr., The Appli-
cability of Contract Law Theory to the AIG Executive Bonus Scandal, 2009 Emerging Issues 3485
(LexisNexis) (“The initial outrage over the millions in taxpayer dollars paid in bonuses to
certain employees of American International Group (AIG) induced an almost frantic
search to discover ways in which this putative injustice could be cured.”). But see Roy C.
Smith, Greed Is Good, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2009, at W1.  Mr. Smith mounts a defense of Wall
Street’s use of bailout funds by arguing as follows:
Many Americans believe that any bonuses for top executives paid by rescued
banks would constitute “excessive compensation,” a phrase used by Mr. Obama.
But no Wall Street CEO taking federal money received a bonus in 2008, and the
same was true for most of their senior colleagues.  Not only did those responsible
receive no bonuses, the value of the stock in their companies paid to them as part
of prior-year bonuses dropped by 70% or more, leaving them, collectively, with
billions of dollars of unrealized losses.
Id.; see also Valerie Bauerlein & Paulo Prada, Curbs on Executive Pay: Among Bankers, Howls—
and Cheers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2009, at A10 (quoting Brady Adams, president of Evergreen
Federal Bank, who protested in response to proposed federal “claw back” provisions for
bonuses paid with Troubled Asset Relief Program funds that exceed $100,000, saying that
“[t]here ought to be consequences, but don’t use a shotgun, use a rifle”).
12. Kenneth P. Thompson & Andrew S. Goodstadt, In Defense of AIG Employees, N.Y. L.J.,
Apr. 10, 2009, at 6. But see id. (contending that the payments were not bonuses but rather
were previously negotiated retention agreements with “hard working, honest and dedi-
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nuses an “‘outrage’” and instructed the Treasury Department to use
“‘every legal avenue’” to recover the funds.13
When Representative Dennis Kucinich of Ohio learned that fi-
nancially crippled Merrill Lynch planned to dispense $3.62 billion of
Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”) funds as executive bonuses,
he asked the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to investi-
gate.14  It was no wonder that he sarcastically described these bonuses
as “little more than a farewell gift from senior management to them-
selves.”15  More than twenty-two times larger than the AIG bonuses,
Merrill Lynch’s payouts represented 36.2% of its TARP allocation.16
Even companies that fired CEOs for having failed on the job be-
stowed unimaginable sums on them.  After sustaining the largest loss
in corporate history, Merrill Lynch fired Stanley O’Neal.17  A sever-
ance package of $160 million must have salved his bruised ego.18  The
same could be said of Robert Nardelli, the former CEO of Home De-
pot.  Fired because of the company’s dismal stock performance, Mr.
Nardelli received severance pay estimated at $210 million.19
These abuses have not merely enraged the public.  They also
shoved a hyperventilating economy toward financial panic.  With the
economy booming, companies became transfixed on short-term
goals—surging profits, revenues, and stock prices.20  Since executive
compensation rose in tandem with profit margins, CEOs gambled on
cated professionals”). See generally Louise Story, Cuomo Says Merrill Deceived Congress on Bo-
nuses, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2009, at B2 (noting that New York Attorney General Andrew
Cuomo is investigating the payment of these bonuses by Bank of America, which acquired
Merrill Lynch).
13. Editorial, Bonuses for Bozos, N.Y. POST, Mar. 17, 2009; see also Deborah Solomon &
Laura Meckler, Strict Executive-Pay Caps Planned—Latest Salvo from Obama Administration Aims
to Rein in Firms Receiving Federal Aid, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2009, at A3 (reporting that Presi-
dent Obama “called it ‘shameful’ that Wall Street firms awarded $20 billion worth of bo-
nuses as taxpayers were bailing them out”).
14. Yin Wilczek, Lawmakers Ask Regulators for Details on Merrill Bonuses, Use of TARP
Funds, 41 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 654 (Apr. 13, 2009).
15. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
16. Id.
17. Gretchen Morgenson, How the Thundering Herd Faltered and Fell,  N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9,
2008, at BU1.
18. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-236, at 7 (2009) (noting O’Neal’s substantial exit package).
19. Id.
20. See Christopher Keller & Michael Stocker, Eyeing Executive Compensation: Pay Struc-
tures Often Spur Chiefs To Focus on Short-Term Results Rather Than Long-Term Value, NAT’L L.J.,
Nov. 17, 2008 (“Years before the current [financial] crisis erupted, analysts suggested that
the new generation of executives of publicly held companies were gambling long-term
economic stability in order to achieve short-term financial goals.”); Kara Scannell, Policy
Makers Work to Give Shareholders More Boardroom Clout, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2009, at B4
(noting the argument that the incentives in executive compensation packages led to exces-
sive risk-taking that caused the credit crunch).
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high-risk strategies.21  CEOs of the major investment firms were partic-
ularly guilty of over-leveraging their portfolios until their debt to eq-
uity ratios were at unsustainable levels.22  Even worse, brokerage firms,
hedge funds, and other investment companies, enticed by potential
windfalls, speculated by selling credit default swaps.23  They “insured”
corporate bonds and collateralized debt obligations against default,
although the companies acquiring the “insurance” did not own the
underlying securities.24  Massive debt led to financial collapse.
The objections to excessive executive compensation, both emo-
tional and economic, are powerful.  The solution to the problem,
however, is not at all clear.  Five broad strategies have emerged and all
have failed.  Moved by the public clamor to reduce executive pay, leg-
islators and regulators have repackaged these worn out strategies in
numerous proposals, but their efforts are unlikely to succeed.  Before
presenting a comprehensive proposal for reform, this Article will dis-
cuss and criticize the five strategies.
Part II of this Article will discuss the fiduciary approach, which
relies on the directors to constrain the avarice of corporate executives.
Referring to the seminal work of Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried,25
this Article will argue that directors, because of the influence of mana-
gerial power and because of their lack of commitment to shareholder
and corporate interests, are unlikely to oppose the selfishness of
CEOs.
Given the failure of directors to protect corporations and share-
holders, Part III of this Article will explore the disclosure approach.
Adopting the philosophy of federal statutory securities law, the SEC
has imposed layer upon layer of compensation-related disclosure re-
21. See Keller & Stocker, supra note 20 (quoting Bear Stearns’s 2007 proxy statement, R
which explained that “[t]he Company’s performance as measured by profit margins re-
mained strong and earnings per share increased over the prior year” and “[t]he compensa-
tion paid to the Company’s executive officers for fiscal 2006 reflects the strength of this
performance” (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
22. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Analyzing the Credit Crisis: Was the SEC Missing in Action?, N.Y.
L.J., Dec. 5, 2008 (arguing that the SEC facilitated over-leveraging, a primary cause of the
credit crisis, by instituting the Consolidated Supervisory Entity program, which effectively
removed the strictures of net capital requirements from the five major investment houses,
Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Morgan Stanley,
thereby permitting these companies to incur debilitating debt to equity ratios).
23. See generally David W. Porteous & James G. Martignon, Credit Default Swaps: Regula-
tory Storm Clouds Brewing, 40 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 2070 (Dec. 15, 2008) (defining
credit default swaps and discussing their speculative risks).
24. Janet Morrissey, Credit Default Swaps: The Next Crisis?, TIME, Mar. 17, 2008, http://
www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1723152,00.html.
25. See infra Part II.A–C (discussing the thesis of Bebchuk and Fried and criticisms of
their argument).
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quirements on reporting companies.  To comply with the most recent
regulatory requirement—the Compensation Discussion and Analy-
sis—companies need compensation consultants and lawyers with spe-
cialized expertise to help compile a report that few investors read and
even fewer understand.
Even if disclosures succeeded in leading shareholders to discover
corporate waste and director dereliction, shareholders would need a
forum to seek a remedy.  The courts, however, have been unreceptive
to cases challenging excessive executive compensation.  Part IV of this
Article will concentrate primarily on the business judgment rule,
which dooms many of these cases.  In this discussion, Part IV will high-
light a notorious case, People v. Grasso.26 The verdict is clear: Litiga-
tion does not work for shareholders.
Since few of the participants in corporate governance are in-
clined or able to contain executive compensation, tax policy provides
an alternative approach.  Part V will discuss incentives in the federal
tax code to cap executive pay and link it to performance.  The most
important tax provision, Section 162(m), provides a $1 million cap on
the deductibility of non-performance-based executive pay.27  Rather
than inducing companies to link pay to performance and cut the pay
of low achievers, this approach has ironically resulted in higher execu-
tive pay and excessive risk-taking.
In response to these executive-pay abuses, legislators and regula-
tors have proposed a spate of corporate governance solutions.  Part VI
will divide these solutions into four categories: (1) non-binding say-on-
pay shareholder proxy votes; (2) shareholder rights to nominate di-
rectors; (3) Senator Schumer’s comprehensive proposal, which incor-
porates say-on-pay, shareholder nomination rights, and numerous
other governance provisions; and (4) direct government control of
executive pay.  In the course of the discussion of direct government
control, Part VI will examine (1) the bill proposed by Senator Durbin,
(2) a separate bill sponsored by Representative Frank and passed by
the House, and (3) the provisions in place for recipients of TARP
funds.  This Part will criticize all these solutions as either undesirable
or ineffective.
To curb executive compensation, a fair and workable framework
must provide shareholders with a determinative voice.  In Part VII,
this Article will propose that Congress and the SEC establish a statu-
26. 893 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 2008); see infra Part IV.C (discussing and criticizing the judi-
cial decisions disposing of the Grasso case).
27. See infra Part V.A (discussing and criticizing § 162(m)).
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tory and regulatory framework to permit the amendment of corporate
bylaws to create “Shareholder Compensation Committees.”  Part VII
will discuss how such committees might be elected, what powers and
obligations committee members might have, and what safeguards
might be instituted to ensure the effective functioning of such com-
mittees.  Part VII will then present and attempt to refute potential ar-
guments against the adoption of this proposal.
The Article will conclude with Part VIII by asking Congress to
enact legislation that would provide for the establishment and effec-
tive operation of Shareholder Compensation Committees.
II. APPROACH ONE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Shareholders entrust officers and directors with running corpora-
tions.28  Like anyone, corporate managers are inclined to promote
their self-interests.29  This temptation is particularly acute in the cor-
porate world where shareholders, as passive investors with tiny frac-
tional equity interests, cannot affect the decisions of management.30
To ensure the fidelity of corporate officers and directors, the law has
imposed fiduciary duties on them.31  Discussing these obligations, the
Supreme Court of Delaware has observed:
While technically not trustees, [officers and directors] stand
in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockhold-
28. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2007).  The statute provides the following:
The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall
be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be
otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.  If any
such provision is made in the certificate of incorporation, the powers and duties
conferred or imposed upon the board of directors by this chapter shall be exer-
cised or performed to such extent and by such person or persons as shall be
provided in the certificate of incorporation.
Id.
29. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 47, 63 (8th ed. 1940) (discussing the divergence between the needs of
the corporation and the desires of the shareholders); David I. Walker, The Manager’s Share,
47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 587, 616 (2005) (explaining that there is a “wedge between the
manager’s private incentives and the incentives of the shareholders generally”).
30. See Walker, supra note 29, at 616 (noting that “outside shareholders cannot per- R
fectly, or costlessly, observe the manager’s effort or focus”); see also BERLE & MEANS, supra
note 29, at 47 (discussing the infinitesimal equity interests that shareholders have in large R
publicly traded corporations).
31. See, e.g., McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 921–23 (Del. 2000) (reinstating share-
holders’ claims against directors for breach of fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and good
faith in recommending sale of chemical corporation); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634
A.2d 345, 351 (Del. 1994) (remanding a case to the trial court where shareholders argued
that the directors breached their duty of care and loyalty in approving a cash-out merger),
modified on reargument, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994).
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ers.  A public policy, existing through the years, and derived
from a profound knowledge of human characteristics and
motives, has established a rule that demands of a corporate
officer or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most
scrupulous observance of his duty . . . .32
The fiduciary duties of directors include the responsibility to set
executive compensation at levels that optimally serve corporate inter-
ests rather than the greed of executives.  The “optimal contracting”
model posits that directors, as corporate fiduciaries, seek to negotiate
executive compensation contracts that optimize shareholder value.
An impressive body of scholarship, however, contradicts this model.33
That scholarship supports the “managerial power” model, which holds
that managers often manipulate directors into providing them with
excessive levels of compensation, thereby diverting value from the
very corporations that directors ostensibly serve.34
A. Pitting Fiduciary Duties Against Managerial Power
In their seminal book, Pay Without Performance, Bebchuk and
Fried argue that managers, most particularly CEOs, exert influence
over directors to raise executive pay significantly beyond levels that
would optimize shareholder value.35  They note that nearly all direc-
tors of publicly traded corporations receive substantial compensation,
32. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510, 515 (Del. 1939) (holding that Guth, the presi-
dent of Loft, misappropriated the business opportunity to acquire Pepsi-Cola from Loft).
33. See generally Walker, supra note 29, at 592 (“The optimal contracting model . . . R
posits that the principal (the board of directors on behalf of the shareholders) can only
imperfectly observe the effort, focus, and effectiveness of its agent (the manager) and ne-
gotiates a contract that minimizes the resulting agency costs . . . .”).
34. See id. at 633 (explaining that the managerial power model cautions that “we
should not expect public companies to reach optimal contracts with managers”); see also
Michael B. Dorff, Does One Hand Wash the Other? Testing the Managerial Power and Optimal
Contracting Theories of Executive Compensation, 30 J. CORP. L. 255, 277 (2005) (providing ex-
perimental findings that directors agree to pay substantially higher compensation to execu-
tives who wield power over them than directors agree to pay to executives who do not wield
power over them).
35. LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 30 (2004); see also Arthur Levitt, Jr., Corporate Culture
and the Problem of Executive Compensation, 30 J. CORP. L. 749, 749 (2005) (“I believe that
Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried have brought to light one of the most important issues
facing our society today.  I agree enthusiastically and almost completely with their analysis
of the problem.” (footnote call number omitted)); Lucian Bebchuk et al., Lucky CEOs and
Lucky Directors, J. FIN. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1405316 (find-
ing that the opportunistic timing of option grants to CEOs coincides with high CEO
power).
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which sometimes exceeds $100,000 annually.36  CEOs, as company
leaders and often as members of boards of directors, have considera-
ble influence over the pay of directors.37  If pleased with the support
they have received from directors, CEOs may use their power to raise
the compensation of compliant directors, or CEOs may punish unco-
operative ones.38  This problem, Bebchuk and Fried argue, is magni-
fied where companies have interlocking directors, that is, where the
CEO of company A is a director of company B, and the CEO of com-
pany B is a director of company A.39  When directors and CEOs have
reciprocal power to affect each other’s pay, all wallets, except those of
shareholders, will tend to fatten.
Directors want to retain their positions, which bring pay, prestige,
various perks, and valuable business contacts.40  CEOs exert a power-
ful and sometimes decisive influence over the nomination process for
directors.41  Bebchuk and Fried contend that, if directors approve
compensation agreements favorable to CEOs, CEOs will use their in-
fluence to include the names of those directors on proxy ballots.42
Social forces, say Bebchuk and Fried, also erode director inde-
pendence.  CEOs, who may simultaneously serve as directors, will tend
to develop personal relationships with other board members.
Bebchuk and Fried believe that a sense of collegiality will discourage
directors from opposing positions that CEOs support, including the
compensation packages that CEOs desire.43  Even directors who retain
a sense of independence may not wish to stand out as contrarians.
Sitting on the board for years, they want to be liked and respected as
36. See Gary Strauss, Companies Pony Up to Keep Directors, USA TODAY, Nov. 21, 2002, at
B1 (noting that, in 2002, compensation for outside directors on Fortune 1000 company
boards averaged $116,000 annually, and such compensation for the top 200 publicly
traded corporations averaged more than $152,000).
37. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 35, at 30–31 (citing a study suggesting collusion be- R
tween CEOs and directors in setting each other’s pay).
38. Id. (arguing that a CEO will use his “bully pulpit” to champion generous pay for
directors who support his or her pay aspirations, and citing evidence that high CEO com-
pensation correlates with high director compensation, despite a negative correlation be-
tween pay and performance).
39. Id. at 29–30 (noting that stock exchange rules prohibit interlocking directors from
sitting on compensation committees, but that any director, even if not on that committee,
may still influence executive pay).
40. Id. at 25–26 (pointing out that CEOs often sit on nominating committees, and even
when they do not, directors often comply with the CEOs’ wishes because angering them
may lead to punitive reprisals).
41. Id. at 26 (noting that CEOs are often on nominating committees and that, in any
event, CEOs can sabotage the nomination of a perceived adversary).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 32 (arguing that directors are subject to the social pressures that affect
human behavior).
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members of the management team, and they want their leader, the
CEO, to think well of them.44
Bebchuk and Fried argue that even independent directors who
maintain their impartiality probably will not represent the interests of
shareholders effectively.  Usually occupied with full-time careers
outside of the corporation, such directors lack the time and knowl-
edge to assess complex compensation packages.45  These directors
generally rely on compensation consultants who ostensibly provide
impartial advice to boards of directors and compensation committees,
which are required for companies listed on the New York Stock Ex-
change (“NYSE”),46 and are, in any event, commonplace at large cor-
porations.47  Although such a practice would seem to provide a circuit
breaker to thwart inflated compensation proposals, Bebchuk and
Fried suggest that compensation consultants often fail to provide un-
biased advice because CEOs have influence over choosing and retain-
ing them.48
B. Camouflaging Excessive Executive Pay
A critical component of Bebchuk and Fried’s thesis is camou-
flage.  They argue that CEOs and other managers wish to maximize
pay while minimizing the constraints that their corporations impose
on them.  Decoupling compensation from performance achieves both
of these goals.49  It enables managers to extract “rents,” which are
compensation benefits arising, not from arm’s length negotiation, but
rather from managerial power.50  Even rents, according to Bebchuk
44. Id. at 31–33 (discussing the social pressures that impel directors to acquiesce to the
demands of CEOs).
45. Id. at 36–37 (noting that independent directors do not spend sufficient time ana-
lyzing compensation packages to evaluate them adequately).
46. NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.05(a) (2009), available at http://
nysemanual.nyse.com/lcm (“Listed companies must have a compensation committee com-
posed entirely of independent directors.”); see also NASDAQ, Inc., NASDAQ Stock Market
Rule 5605(d)(2) (2009), available at http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com (requiring the com-
pensation of executive officers of companies listed on NASDAQ to be determined or rec-
ommended by a majority of independent directors or a compensation committee
comprised entirely of independent directors).
47. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 35, at 24. R
48. Id. at 37–38 (observing that the pay of compensation consultants is not linked to
shareholder value, so compensation consultants have no incentive to protect the interests
of shareholders when those interests are adverse to the interests of CEOs).
49. Id. at 63 (noting that when pay is decoupled from performance, managers can
pursue strategies such as empire building, which may serve the personal interests of the
manager rather than the interests of the shareholders).
50. Id. at 62 (defining “rents” as “the additional value that managers obtain beyond
what they would get in arm’s-length bargaining with a board that had both the inclination
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and Fried, have upper limits.  When pay reaches outlandish levels, the
public in general and shareholders in particular may protest and exert
pressure to reduce it.51  To divert attention from excessive pay levels,
the architects of compensation arrangements, according to Bebchuk
and Fried, camouflage rents in two principal ways.  First, companies
obscure the amounts of compensation.52  Second, companies disguise
rents by falsely characterizing them as performance-related
compensation.53
Since the writing of Pay Without Performance, the SEC has sought
to curtail these camouflaging practices by requiring publicly traded
companies to include a Compensation Discussion and Analysis and
expanded tabular disclosures in their proxy statements.54  This ex-
panded narrative and tabular regime promised to increase trans-
parency, but after three years the strategy seems to have failed.  Now
companies camouflage questionable compensation provisions with
self-serving platitudes folded into complex, incomplete, and seem-
ingly interminable disclosures.55  Though the designers of compensa-
tion packages portray executive compensation arrangements as
primarily performance-based, such arrangements seem to result more
from managerial power than from arm’s length negotiations.
1. Bonuses
Boards of directors characterize bonuses as performance-based by
tying them either to stock price or to financial results such as earn-
ings.56  Companies take the position that good management is the
to maximize shareholder value and the necessary time and information to perform that
task properly”).
51. Id. at 64–65; see also Walker, supra note 29, at 634 (noting that outrage over exces- R
sive compensation may damage the reputations of officers and directors).
52. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 35, at 67 (discussing the “dressing, packaging, or hid- R
ing” of rent extraction).
53. Id. at 145; see also Walker, supra note 29, at 637 (arguing that equity incentives R
provide cover for managers to hike their compensation even more than would otherwise
be possible).  Bebchuk and Fried criticize the pre-1992 and 1992 SEC disclosure require-
ments as inadequate to prevent camouflaging. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 35, at R
67–68 (explaining that under the pre-1992 rules, firms “took full advantage of their discre-
tion to obscure the amount and form of their pay” and continued to do so under the 1992
rules).  As will be shown in Part III, the current SEC disclosure rules, adopted in 2006, have
also failed to curtail the obfuscation of executive compensation arrangements.
54. See infra Part III.C.
55. See infra Part III.C.2.
56. See, e.g., INTEL CORP., NOTICE OF 2009 ANNUAL STOCKHOLDERS’ MEETING 26 (2009),
available at http://www.intc.com/intelProxy2009/common/pdfs/Intel_2009_Proxy.pdf
[hereinafter INTEL NOTICE] (disclosing that executive compensation packages include “eq-
uity awards that reward stock price appreciation” and “[a]nnual and semiannual incentive
cash payments [that] are determined primarily by Intel’s annual financial results”).
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cause of rising stock prices and earnings increases and that managers
should therefore be rewarded.  Bebchuk and Fried point out that
stock prices and financial metrics often benefit from bullish market
conditions, which are unrelated to executive performance.57  Further-
more, the drafters of compensation agreements sometimes manipu-
late targets that will trigger bonuses so that they are almost
inevitable.58  Bebchuk and Fried argue that an arm’s length negotia-
tion would not yield a contract that assures a bonus regardless of
performance.59
Presumably to establish a more sensitive measure of performance,
a compensation committee or board of directors will ordinarily retain
discretion to depart from objective measures of performance and to
decide the magnitude of bonuses based on subjective assessments.60
Bebchuk and Fried observe that subjective determinations might fairly
calibrate executive performance if the decisions were not left to direc-
tors inclined to support whatever package the CEO proposed.61  Thus,
regardless of whether market-driven objective measures or director-
controlled subjective measures are used, compensation committees
will award bonuses even when unsatisfactory executive performance
would counsel otherwise.62  This state of affairs, Bebchuk and Fried
argue, suggests that managerial power, rather than the interests of
shareholders, dictates the terms of executive bonuses.63
2. Options
Once comprising the bulk of executive compensation, base salary
has receded in prominence.64  Option grants, over recent years, have
grown into a predominant component of executive pay.65  The osten-
57. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 35, at 123 (citing empirical evidence to show correla- R
tion between executive pay and general market conditions).
58. Id. at 127 (noting that companies reset performance goals if executives fail to meet
them).
59. Id. at 126–27.
60. Id. at 126; see also Time Warner, Inc., Notice of Annual Meeting of Stockholders
(Form DEFA14A), at 56 (Apr. 8, 2009), available at http://ir.timewarner.com/phoenix.
zhtml?c=70972&p=irol-sec&control_selectgroup=Proxy%20Filings [hereinafter Time
Warner Notice] (“The Committee exercises discretion in determining the actual bonus
amount paid (if any) to executive officers.”).
61. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 35, at 126. R
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 137 (describing the increased use of stock options as compensation during
the 1990s).
65. Id. (“Stock options became an increasingly important component of executive
compensation during [the 1990s].”); see also Walker, supra note 29, at 641–42 (“Stock op- R
tion compensation for CEOs and other senior corporate executives increased dramatically
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\69-3\MLR301.txt unknown Seq: 13 25-MAY-10 6:34
2010] TAKING STOCK—SALARY AND OPTIONS TOO 431
sible reason for this trend is that option awards are performance-
based.66 Bebchuk and Fried question the reliability of the linkage be-
tween options and performance because market conditions affect
stock prices.67
Bebchuk and Fried note that the effects of market-wide fluctua-
tions could be eliminated by indexing the exercise price of options to
discount for changes in the broader market.68  Indexing would not
only eliminate the effects of rising economic tides, but it would also
protect managers from the effects of market declines.69  In general,
however, indexing would work to the disadvantage of managers be-
cause markets tend to rise in the long run.  The managerial power
model, according to Bebchuk and Fried, explains why few companies
have paid their executives with indexed options.70
If options expire worthless because the stock price has fallen,
many companies will either reprice the options by lowering the strike
price or, more commonly, will issue new options at lower strike
prices.71  Bebchuk and Fried call this practice “backdoor repricing.”72
in the 1990s.”).  Companies listed on both the NASDAQ and NYSE must submit all equity
compensation plans to a binding vote of the shareholders.  NASDAQ, Inc., supra note 46, R
at Rule 5635(c) (requiring shareholder approval of all equity compensation plans); NYSE,
Inc., supra note 46, § 303A.08 (“Shareholders must be given the opportunity to vote on all R
equity-compensation plans and material revisions thereto . . . .”).  These provisions, how-
ever, do not afford shareholders meaningful input in the compensation process.  Proposed
equity compensation plans are highly complex and are phrased in general terms.  Such
plans provide shareholders with scant guidance as to specific equity awards that the com-
pany will grant to its executives.
66. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 35, at 137–38 (noting that “option compensation R
increases equity ownership and thereby helps link pay to performance”).
67. Id. at 139 (conceding that managers may lose compensation when options fall, but
arguing that gains from fortuitous stock fluctuations outstrip losses).
68. Id. at 141 (arguing that indexing options heightens the incentive for managers to
achieve superior levels of performance because managers will not be able to rely on market
or sector fluctuations to enhance the value of their options); see also Compensation Structure
and Systemic Risk: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 3–4 (2009) (state-
ment of Professor Lucian A. Bebchuk) (advising that option grants to executives should be
exercisable over five-year periods, but that an executive’s right to sell options should not
have to await the executive’s departure from the company); Walker, supra note 29, at R
652–53 (observing that the lack of indexing contradicts the optimal contracting model and
supports the managerial power model).
69. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 35, at 141–42. R
70. Id. at 143.
71. See, e.g., INTEL NOTICE, supra note 56, at 15 (showing that options awarded to cer- R
tain directors were issued at lower exercise prices after the year 2000).
72. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 35, at 165.  Some companies allow the reloading of R
options by issuing new options at the price at which the option holder exercises existing
options.  This practice allows the option holder to profit from spikes in the stock price
while retaining his option position.  Should the stock spike a second time, the option
holder will be able to reap the benefit. Id. at 169.
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They argue that repricing is a camouflaged giveaway to managers be-
cause repriced options pay the recipient for failure rather than suc-
cess.73  Such options will, if for no other reason than luck, bounce into
the money sooner or later.  What appears to be performance-based
compensation is in reality a guaranteed paycheck.74  By assuring that
executives will receive option-based compensation regardless of their
performance, repriced options have a perverse effect: They provide a
disincentive for managers to work hard for the company because
repriced options decouple pay from performance.75
3. Restricted Stock
Bebchuk and Fried note that restricted stock is becoming a com-
mon means of providing executive compensation.76  Like all equity,
restricted stock will react to extrinsic market conditions and therefore
may not reflect executive performance.77  Nevertheless, some com-
mentators prefer grants of restricted stock to grants of options be-
cause restricted stock, which must be held for substantial periods of
time, discourages managers from engaging in high-risk strategies de-
signed to drive stock prices higher over the short term.78  This justifi-
73. Id. at 165–66.
74. See id. at 165 (explaining that current practices regarding options “do not leave
executives empty-handed”).  Executives may have an incentive to precipitate short-term
declines in the value of the stock so that the company will grant them options at lower
strike prices. Id. at 166.  Once they have received bushels of cheap options, they will at-
tempt to restore the stock to its previous high and sell their options.  This strategy may be
curtailed to some degree by having the options vest over a period of years, which is a
practice that has been adopted by many public companies.
75. See id. at 165 (explaining that “backdoor repricing” has “further weakened the link
between option pay and managerial performance”).  Defenders of option repricing argue
that market conditions may drive options underwater and that executives should not be
punished for circumstances beyond their control. Id. at 166.  Indexed options, however,
provide a more equitable solution to the problem because they do not guarantee compen-
sation to executives who may be responsible for declines in the company’s stock. See id.
(“Using indexed options . . . will generally ensure that options remain valuable, and that
managers continue to have incentives to perform, when markets decline.”).
76. Id. at 171 (noting that the increased use of restricted stock in executive compensa-
tion arrangements is a reaction to shareholder dissatisfaction with the use of conventional
options); see also J. MARK POERIO, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION DISCLOSURE UPDATE—2009
PROXY SEASON, PART 2 (2009) (noting that grants of restricted stock units have increased
because, unlike options, restricted stock units are virtually never worthless).
77. See generally Andrew C.W. Lund, What Was the Question? The NYSE and Nasdaq’s Curi-
ous Listing Standards Requiring Shareholder Approval of Equity-Compensation Plans, 39 CONN. L.
REV. 119, 127–28 (2006) (explaining the value of restricted stock in comparison to other
equity awards).
78. See Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Simplicity,
Transparency and Committing to the Long-Term 11–13 (Yale Law & Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 393, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1506742 (arguing that delay-
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cation is questionable since the vesting of option grants may be
delayed.79  An executive’s preference for restricted stock over options,
however, is understandable, according to Bebchuk and Fried, because
the windfall derived from restricted stock exceeds the windfall derived
from options: If the company’s stock price falls, an option may be
worthless, but restricted stock will retain value.80
C. Criticisms of the Managerial Power Model
Despite its enormous influence, Bebchuk and Fried’s work has
encountered considerable criticism.81  Professor Jeffrey Gordon, for
example, has cogently expressed many objections to their thesis.82
Though conceding that Bebchuk and Fried have identified and ex-
plained some executive pay abuses, Gordon argues that they have
overstated the case for the managerial power model.83
ing the vesting of equity awards for several years after executives have left companies would
diminish perverse incentives to take ill-advised risks).
79. See id. at 12–13 (noting that option awards would not encourage excessively risky
executive business decisions if vesting were delayed to coincide with the holding periods
associated with restricted stock).
80. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 35, at 171–72. R
81. See, e.g., Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power Versus
the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847, 868 (2002) (arguing that the option
practices that Bebchuk and Fried attribute to managerial power actually result from mis-
perceptions of the cost and value of options); Franklin G. Snyder, More Pieces of the CEO
Compensation Puzzle, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 129, 135 (2003) (arguing that “the managerial
power approach is, at best, only a partial picture of the CEO compensation puzzle and, at
worst, entirely misguided”).  James McConvill challenges the premise that the desire for
high monetary compensation motivates corporate executives.  James McConvill, Executive
Compensation and Corporate Governance: Rising Above the “Pay-for-Performance” Principle, 43 AM.
BUS. L.J. 413, 416 (2006).  He argues that intangible factors motivate executive behavior.
Id. at 423–25.  These factors include ego-fulfillment, self-esteem, recognition, achievement,
and self-actualization. Id.  Psychological intangibles certainly provide powerful motivation
for human behavior, but our society has exalted money to preeminent status. See BEBCHUK
& FRIED, supra note 35, at 61–64 (suggesting that executives and managers are primarily R
driven by the acquisition of money and other personal profits).  People can seek to affirm
their egos while simultaneously accruing as much cash as they can.  It is ironic that wealth
accumulation and feelings of personal fulfillment are not mutually exclusive.  Steeped in
materialism, our culture teaches us that making bundles of money is evidence of self-worth
and competence.  Nearly everyone is conditioned to seek material wealth.
82. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation: If There’s a Problem, What’s the Remedy?  The
Case for “Compensation Discussion and Analysis,” 30 J. CORP. L. 675, 688 (2005) (noting that
some practices that Bebchuk and Fried characterize as abuses are sometimes benign and
even salutary).
83. Id.
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1. Competing Explanations
Gordon asserts that several factors, including arm’s length negoti-
ating, have a significant effect on executive pay.84  He argues, for ex-
ample, that attaining the coveted position of a company’s CEO is the
culmination of a “tournament.”85  The prize for winning the competi-
tion includes rewards for past performance.86  Although this explana-
tion for non-performance-based pay may have some validity, it is at
least arguably consistent with the managerial power model: The win-
ner of the prize gets to set the terms of his or her compensation.
According to Professor Gordon, the tendency to overpay CEOs
also arises from their “superstar” status.87  When a board anoints a
new CEO, the board will shower him or her with favor.88  This expla-
nation, which carries intuitive appeal, seems altogether consistent
with the managerial power model.  If a board views a CEO as a super-
star, the CEO will wield the power to extract rents.
Although not discussed by Gordon, an alternative explanation for
high executive pay is the directors’ inherent lack of commitment to
shareholder interests.89  When directors authorize executive compen-
sation packages, they are dispensing corporate assets, not their own.
They may not feel a sense of loyalty to an enterprise owned by a name-
less aggregation of individual shareholders and impersonal institu-
tional investors.  People get more excited about protecting their own
property than about protecting the property of others.90  Small equity
84. See infra notes 85–88 and accompanying text. R
85. Gordon, supra note 82, at 680. R
86. Id.
87. Id. at 684 (noting that directors are sometimes deluded into believing that a new
CEO will deliver the impossible).
88. See id. (suggesting that it is not surprising that a board will pay a promising new
CEO generously).
89. Professor Charles Elson has noted:
Because boards of the large public corporations were now comprised of a
number of outside individuals with little connection to the enterprise other than
their relation with management, changes would have to be made in the corpora-
tion’s relationship with them.  This new breed of outside director often had little
or no shareholding interest in the enterprise and, as such, no longer represented
their own personal financial stakes or those of the other shareholders in render-
ing board service.
Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-Captured Board: The History of a
Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. REV. 127, 141 (1996).  Professor Elson recognizes that
providing outside directors with salaries or even relatively small blocks of shares does not
align their interests with shareholders.  To motivate directors to protect shareholder inter-
ests, he believes that they must own a substantial stake in the company. Id. at 165.  Unfor-
tunately, many directors have not reached the requisite level of equity ownership.
90. Adam Smith recognized this aspect of the agency problem.  He famously observed,
“The directors of [a joint stock company], however, being the managers rather of other
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stakes are not likely to overcome a director’s human predisposition
toward shirking.  Designed to counteract this tendency, fiduciary du-
ties have failed to sensitize directors to the interests of shareholders
and corporations.
A diverse set of forces unquestionably affects the negotiating pro-
cess, and it would be simplistic to believe that all companies operate in
precisely the same manner.  Nor is it sensible to contend that direc-
tors never satisfy their fiduciary duties.  It should be noted, however,
that although Bebchuk and Fried may overstate the explanatory force
of the managerial power model, they do acknowledge that arm’s
length negotiating still operates in varying degrees in some corporate
settings.91  As Professor Stephen Bainbridge has noted, “In sum, it
seems plausible that the evidence does not exclusively support the
managerial power model but rather supports multiple hypotheses that
may prove complementary rather than competing.”92  Thus, the ques-
tion is not whether Bebchuk and Fried are right, but rather how right
they are.93  One thing is certain: Regardless of the reason for its fail-
ure, the fiduciary model has not exerted the necessary discipline over
directors to keep executive compensation at reasonable levels.
2. Conventional Versus Indexed Options
Having attempted to show that reasons other than managerial
power contribute to high executive pay, Gordon challenges Bebchuk
and Fried’s arguments relating to specific types of compensation.  Be-
cause Bebchuk and Fried concentrate much of their discussion on the
people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over
it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery fre-
quently watch over their own.” 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 264–65 (Edwin Cannan ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1976) (1776);
see also Claire A. Hill & Brett McDonnell, Executive Compensation and the Optimal Penumbra of
Delaware Corporate Law, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 333, 349 (2009) (“An agent might take less care
and attention as to her principal’s business than she would as to her own business.”).
91. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 35, at 42–43 (acknowledging that “[a]lthough the R
pay-setting process has departed from arm’s-length bargaining in most widely held public
companies, this process has likely worked better in some companies than in others”).
92. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1615,
1631–32 (2005) (reviewing LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE:
THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004)) (summarizing evidence
inconsistent with the managerial power model).
93. Professor Gordon acknowledges this point. See Gordon, supra note 82, at 688 (rec- R
ognizing that “Bebchuk and Fried have generated a prima facie case that managerial
power plays a significant role in the setting of executive compensation”).  Gordon’s point
is, because factors other than managerial power hike up executive compensation, the
means to remedy excessive pay often differ from the means of constraining managerial
power. Id.
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prevalence of conventional rather than indexed options, Gordon simi-
larly focuses on that issue.
Gordon asserts that awards of conventional options may result
from arm’s length bargaining.94  He suggests that some boards, in suc-
cessive years, decrease or discontinue option grants to punish sub-par
performance.95  Though Gordon may be right in some cases, the com-
mon practice of issuing new options at lower strike prices seems to
contradict his suggestion that boards commonly adjust option grants
to reflect performance.
Defending option repricing, Gordon believes it helps companies
retain key managers in sluggish economic environments.96  The “re-
tention” argument, however, provides a dubious justification for any
wasteful compensation arrangement.  Falling stock prices and earn-
ings might signal the failure of management as much as a foundering
economy.  The over-leveraging of financial institutions such as AIG
and Merrill Lynch provides a stark example.97  Rather than receiving
exorbitant bonuses, managers who exposed their companies to reck-
less investment strategies do not deserve their jobs.
The practice of not canceling out-of-the-money options further
contradicts Gordon’s argument.98  If boards operated at arm’s length,
they would, when issuing new options, cancel those previously
granted.  Letting managers retain such options rewards failure.
There is, however, a persuasive alternative explanation to mana-
gerial power that explains why companies prefer awarding executives
conventional rather than indexed options.  As Gordon notes, federal
tax law treats conventional options more favorably than it treats in-
dexed options.99  Because conventional options are deemed to be per-
formance-based, the cost of conventional options, regardless of the
amount, is tax deductible under Section 162(m) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code.100  Indexed options, however, are not per se performance-
94. Id. at 682.
95. Id. at 681 (noting that drafting indexed options entails a transaction cost, and to
make conventional options performance-related, boards sometimes require the forfeiture
of unvested conventional options).
96. Id. at 686 (asserting that the repricing of options occurs most commonly in troub-
led growing companies).
97. See supra notes 20–24 and accompanying text. R
98. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 35, at 165 (“When executives are left holding R
options that are out-of-the-money, firms often engage in backdoor repricing by replenish-
ing the executive with additional options that have a lower exercise price.”).
99. Gordon, supra note 82, at 681. R
100. See infra notes 268–72 and accompanying text (discussing the tax deductibility of R
options under § 162(m)).
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based, and therefore may not qualify for unlimited tax
deductibility.101
3. Outrage
Gordon faults Bebchuk and Fried for missing the obvious: Exces-
sive compensation outrages the public, regardless of whether the pay
is performance-based.102  Although Bebchuk and Fried defend any
level of executive pay if it is performance-related,103 it is not at all clear
that they attribute public outrage solely to the decoupling of pay from
performance.  If they do, they are wrong.  The sheer magnitude of
many executive compensation arrangements has unquestionably en-
raged the public.  Workers who live from paycheck to paycheck can-
not fathom how Richard Grasso finagled a $187 million seven-year
compensation package working for a not-for-profit organization or
why Michael Ovitz received $130 million for failing at Disney.104
D. A Possible Solution
No matter what the cause of astronomical executive pay, share-
holders cannot trust boards of directors, compensation committees,
or consultants to protect their interests.  The problem is clear; the
issue is how to resolve it.  One approach would be to institute a disclo-
sure system that would compel companies to lay bare all the facts,
figures, and policies underlying their executive compensation prac-
tices.  If shareholders knew all the material information, they could
pressure officers and directors to arrive at more reasonable pay ar-
rangements.  The SEC has taken this approach for seventy years with
disappointing results.  After revamping disclosure requirements time
after time, executive compensation has accelerated to greater and
greater heights.
101. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi) (1996) (“Compensation attributable to a stock
option or a stock appreciation right is deemed [fully tax deductible if] the amount of
compensation the employee could receive is based solely on an increase in the value of the
stock after the date of the grant or award.”).
102. Gordon, supra note 82, at 677 (“In particular, Bebchuk and Fried have only par- R
tially captured the reason why the public is concerned about executive compensation.  It is
not only the alleged disconnect between pay and performance, but the absolute level, espe-
cially in relation to other social frames of value.”).
103. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 35, at 8 (“We would accept compensation at current R
or even higher levels as long as such compensation, through its incentive effects, actually
serves shareholders.”).
104. See infra Part IV.C.
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III. APPROACH TWO: DISCLOSURE
Over the years, the SEC has toughened the compensation-related
disclosure rules.  The current regulatory framework, which burdens
corporations with extensive and often pointless requirements, has im-
posed more costs in money and manpower on corporations, while
generating fees for corporate lawyers and compensation consultants.
Even during the current financial crisis, executive compensation for
most CEOs continues to rise.105
A. Origin of the Disclosure Model
The Great Depression rocked the capital markets and staggered
the national economy for over a decade.  At the onset of the Depres-
sion, some reformers supported the implementation of a new regula-
tory regime in which the federal government would have decided
whether a business seeking entry into capital markets was worthy of
admittance.106  Opposed to this view, Franklin Roosevelt endorsed the
disclosure model of securities regulation.  Shortly after his inaugura-
tion, he delivered a message to Congress, cautioning that the govern-
ment should not guarantee to the public the soundness of newly
issued securities.  Rather, he advocated the adoption of a disclosure
system:
There is, however, an obligation upon us to insist that
every issue of new securities to be sold in interstate com-
merce shall be accompanied by full publicity and informa-
tion, and that no essentially important element attending the
issue shall be concealed from the buying public.107
105. See supra notes 1–19 and accompanying text. R
106. James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 29, 30 (1959) (“As the criticism mounted, doubts as to the value of the very system of
private enterprise were generated, and a wide demand was prevalent for the institution of
procedures of governmental control that would in essence have created a capital issues
bureaucracy to control not only the manner in which securities could be issued but the
very right of any enterprise to tap the capital market.”).
107. H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, vol. 2, at 2 (1933). Chaired by Sam Rayburn, the House Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce agreed with President Roosevelt’s assessment.
The Committee Report emphasized that a new federal law should provide “that there . . .
be full disclosure of every essentially important element attending the issue of a new secur-
ity,” but that the disclosure requirements should “not . . . be capable of being construed as
an approval or guarantee of a security issue.” Id. at 3.  Huston Thompson, a former mem-
ber of the Federal Trade Commission, drafted a bill that was introduced into Congress but
ultimately rejected.  Landis, supra note 106, at 30–31.  This bill sought to institute a merit R
system of securities regulation and would have vested the Federal Trade Commission with
the authority to revoke the registration of any proposed securities offering if the issuer’s
affairs were in “unsound condition,” if it was “insolvent,” or if the issuer’s business was “not
based upon sound principles.”  H.R. 4314, 73d Cong. § 6(e)–(f) (1st Sess. 1933).
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The Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”)108 followed
Roosevelt’s view that the requirements of federal law “should be lim-
ited to full and fair disclosure of the nature of the security being of-
fered and that there should be no authority to pass upon the
investment quality of the security.”109  This disclosure system has en-
dured throughout the history of securities regulation in the United
States.110  In Basic Inc. v. Levinson,111 the Supreme Court recognized
that “[d]isclosure, and not paternalistic withholding of accurate infor-
mation, is the policy chosen and expressed by Congress.”112
The disclosure approach of the Securities Act is generally sound.
The government should not control access to capital markets by deter-
mining which companies are worthy of investment.  Delegating such
power to regulators would choke off speculative business ventures that
might well founder but might, however, introduce innovative prod-
ucts or revolutionary technologies.  Armed with full disclosure, every
investor, whether institutional or private, must decide what is an ac-
ceptable level of risk.
Reluctant to exert direct pressure on issues of corporate govern-
ance, the SEC has reflexively applied the disclosure model to deal
with most issues affecting securities and securities markets.113  Almost
from its inception, the SEC has applied the disclosure model to the
question of executive compensation.114  In November 2008, Christo-
pher Cox, former Chairman of the SEC, reaffirmed the Commission’s
commitment to the disclosure approach:
108. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa
(2006)).
109. Landis, supra note 106, at 34. R
110. See SEC, 2008 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 5 (2008), http://www.sec.
gov/about/secpar/secpar2008.pdf (announcing the 21st Century Disclosure Initiative).
111. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
112. Id. at 234.
113. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (stating
that a “fundamental purpose” of federal securities law “was to substitute a philosophy of
full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of
business ethics in the securities industry”); Omari Scott Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill: The
Imponderable Impact of Executive Compensation Reform, 62 SMU L. REV. 299, 328 (2009) (recog-
nizing “a federal reluctance to directly regulate the internal affairs of the corporation,” and
instead to use indirect means of regulation “such as disclosure”).  Professor Simmons be-
lieves that Congress has used indirect forms of regulation to minimize “political backlash
from powerful corporate constituencies.” Id.  He argues that, because of political self-inter-
est, lawmakers, on both the federal and state levels, focus public attention on the inflam-
matory but relatively unimportant issue of executive compensation, while diverting
attention from more urgent and controversial issues such as unemployment, plant closings,
job outsourcing, and income inequality. Id. at 306.
114. See Amended Proxy Rules, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-1823, 3 Fed.
Reg. 1991, 1991–92 (Aug. 13, 1938) (establishing the first disclosure rules).
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During FY 2008 the SEC also launched the 21st Century
Disclosure Initiative, a wide-ranging internal effort to funda-
mentally rethink public company disclosure. . . .  The Initia-
tive is focused on using new technology to gather
information from registrants in new ways that can generate
more dynamic, accessible, and easier to use disclosure for
investors.115
President Obama selected Mary Schapiro to serve as the new
Chairman of the SEC.116  Under her leadership, the SEC has ex-
pressed a desire to increase shareholder rights to participate in the
process of nominating directors.117  Although praiseworthy, this mea-
sure would not vest shareholders with sufficient power to control exec-
utive compensation in a meaningful way.118  In any event, the SEC,
even under the present administration, has expressed its continuing
commitment to the disclosure approach and has introduced a propo-
sal to expand disclosure requirements.119  This effort will not work.
All the SEC’s past disclosure initiatives have failed to reduce rampant
executive pay abuse.  Rather, it appears that the disclosure require-
ments have had the perverse effect of adding to the problem.120
115. SEC, supra note 110, at 5; see also John W. White, Dir. of Corp. Fin., SEC, Speech by R
SEC Staff: Principles Matter: Related Person Transactions Disclosure and Disclosure Con-
trols and Procedures (Oct. 12, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/
spch101206jww.htm (extolling the virtues of “principles-based disclosure” in the “securities
and disclosure arena” (internal quotation marks omitted));  John W. White, Dir. of Corp.
Fin., SEC, Speech by SEC Staff: Where’s the Analysis? (Oct. 9, 2007), available at http://
www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch100907jww.htm (stressing the SEC’s commitment to
“implementing the new disclosure requirements, gathering the new information, and craft-
ing the new disclosures for investors,” and concluding that “investors are well-served by the
new disclosures”).  Meredith Cross succeeded Mr. White as the new Director of the SEC
Division of Corporation Finance on April 13, 2009. See Press Release, SEC, Meredith Cross
Named New Director of SEC Division of Corporation Finance (Apr. 13, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-78.htm.
116. Press Release, SEC, Mary Schapiro Sworn in as Chairman of SEC (Jan. 27, 2009),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-11.htm.
117. See infra Part VI.B.1.
118. See infra Part VI.B.3.
119. See Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Fin.
Servs. and Gen. Gov’t of the S. Comm. on Appropriations 6 (June 2, 2009), available at
http://appropriations.senate.gov/ht-financial.cfm?method=hearings.view&id=df601eee-c2
68-4afc-a483-3afd25f719a2 (commenting on the SEC’s desire to expand disclosure require-
ments); see also Proxy Disclosure and Solicitation Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 35,076 (pro-
posed July 17, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 239, 240, 249, 270, 274).  The
proposed rule change would require the disclosure of (1) qualifications of candidates for
boards, (2) company leadership structures, (3) company risk-management process, and (4)
fees paid to compensation consultants and additional services that they provide to the is-
suer. Id. at 35,082, 35,085–87.
120. See infra Part III.C.2.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\69-3\MLR301.txt unknown Seq: 23 25-MAY-10 6:34
2010] TAKING STOCK—SALARY AND OPTIONS TOO 441
B. Background of the SEC’s Executive Compensation Disclosure Rules
Both the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(“Exchange Act”)121 provide broad requirements for disclosing execu-
tive and director compensation.122  To implement these require-
ments, the SEC adopted its first compensation-related rules in
1938.123  Since then, the SEC has periodically tinkered with its re-
quirements by vacillating between narrative disclosures, tabular disclo-
sures, or a combination of both.  In various incarnations, these
requirements have sought to keep pace with changing strategies for
compensating executives—and camouflaging their compensation.124
The efforts have been like a man chasing a moving train.
The SEC has taken a restrictive view of how disclosures should be
used, frowning on the use of such disclosures to launch litigation: “If
shareholders are not satisfied with the decisions reflected in the re-
port, the proper response is the ballot, not resort to the courts . . . .”125
Even today, with stories of excessive executive pay flooding the media,
the SEC does not wish its rules to influence corporate decisionmak-
121. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78nn
(2006)).
122. Item 14 of Schedule A to the Securities Act requires registrants to disclose “remu-
neration, paid or estimated to be paid, by the issuer or its predecessor, directly or indi-
rectly, during the past year and ensuing year to (a) the directors or persons performing
similar functions, and (b) its officers . . .  naming them wherever such remuneration ex-
ceeded $25,000 during any such year.”  15 U.S.C. § 77aa (2006).  A similar provision in the
Exchange Act requires the disclosure of the remuneration of “directors, officers, and un-
derwriters, and each security holder of record holding more than 10 per centum of any
class of any equity security of the issuer.” Id. § 78l(b)(1)(D).
123. Amended Proxy Rules, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-1823, 3 Fed.
Reg. 1991 (Aug. 13, 1938).
124. See, e.g., Executive Compensation Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,126, 48,129 (Oct. 21,
1992) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 240, 249) (“The Summary Compensation Table
was praised by shareholder commenters . . . .  Through this more objective, formatted
presentation of compensation information, which in the past often has been furnished in
widely dispersed and disjointed narrative, shareholders will be able to understand clearly
compensation for the last completed fiscal year . . . .” (footnote call number omitted));
Disclosure of Executive Compensation, 48 Fed. Reg. 44,467, 44,469 (Sept. 29, 1983) (codi-
fied at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 230, 231, 239, 240, 241, 270, 274) (limiting tabular disclosure to
cash compensation); Amendments to Disclosure Forms, 43 Fed. Reg. 58,181 (Dec. 13,
1978) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 229.90) (expanding tabular disclosures to cover all forms
of executive compensation); Solicitation of Proxies, 17 Fed. Reg. 11,431 (Dec. 18, 1952)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (requiring separate tables for pensions and deferred com-
pensation). See generally MARK A. BORGES, SEC EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION DISCLOSURE
RULES 4–8 (2008) (summarizing changes to the SEC’s disclosure rules for executive
compensation).
125. Executive Compensation Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,126, 48,138 (Oct. 21, 1992)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 240, 249); see also id. at 48,127 (explaining that
“changes have been made” in response to concern of potential litigation).
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ing.  In discussing the 2006 amendments to the disclosure rules, John
W. White, former Director of the SEC’s Division of Corporation Fi-
nance, stressed the SEC’s refusal to become entangled in executive
compensation arrangements:
I have already used the word “disclosure” a couple of times
this evening, and I really want to emphasize that the Com-
mission’s new rules [adopted in 2006] are all about disclo-
sure.  I believe the Commission and its staff take very
seriously the charge—as our Chairman, Chris Cox, has made
clear—that the Commission is not in the business of setting
executive compensation.  Not even in subtle ways.  Nor is the
Commission in the business of judging companies or boards
about the decisions they make in this area. . . .
[S]hareholders and investors . . . [using the disclosed infor-
mation] can react how ever they like.126
Even when shareholders ferreted out suspected abuses, they would
have to find a means of redress without the help of the SEC.
C. The Current Framework
Adopted in 2006, the extensive disclosure requirements of the
current rules apply to Securities Act registration statements, Exchange
Act registration statements, periodic reports, and proxy statements.127
These rules compel companies registered under the Exchange Act to
bombard shareholders with information.  After describing these oner-
ous rules, this Article will argue that they are ineffective.
1. Summary of the Requirements of the Current Framework
Item 402 of Regulation S-K,128 the primary source of the compen-
sation disclosure requirements, begins benignly.  It provides that all
disclosures must be expressed in “clear, concise and understandable”
language.129  The rule goes on to designate the executive officers
whose compensation must be disclosed.  “Covered” executives include
a company’s CEO and the next four most highly paid executive
officers.130
126. John W. White, Dir. of Corp. Fin., SEC, Speech by SEC Staff: Executive Compensa-
tion Disclosure and the Important Role of CFO’s (Oct. 3, 2006), available at http://www.
sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch100306jww.htm.
127. Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158,
53,158 (Sept. 8, 2006) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 232, 239, 240, 245, 249, 274).
128. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2006).
129. Id. § 229.402(a)(2).
130. Id. § 229.402(a)(3).  Item 402 also provides that disclosure is mandated for up to
two additional persons who, but for ending their service as executive officers before the
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The Compensation Discussion and Analysis (“CD&A”) is the cen-
terpiece of the new disclosure requirements.131  The fundamental
purpose of the CD&A is to provide all material information so that
investors can understand a company’s compensation policies and its
decisions in compensating the covered executive officers.132  To
achieve this end, the new regulation requires the CD&A to contain so-
called “principles-based” rather than boilerplate disclosures.133  The
purpose of the principles-based system is to compel more meaningful
disclosures than the sometimes stilted disclosures made under previ-
ous regimes, although, as shown below, registrants have effectively
evaded even the principles-based disclosure requirements.
The CD&A must “explain all material elements” of the reporting
registrant’s compensation to each covered executive.134  Understanda-
bly, the SEC will not delegate to registrants the unfettered power to
determine materiality, so the SEC provides mandatory components of
the CD&A including (1) objectives of the registrant’s compensation
program; (2) what the compensation program seeks to reward; (3)
each element of compensation; (4) why the registrant chooses to pay
each element of compensation; (5) how the registrant determines, for
each element, the amount of pay and, where applicable, the formula;
and (6) how the registrant’s decisions under each element fit into the
registrant’s overall compensation objectives and affect compensation
decisions under other elements.135
In keeping with the principles-based disclosure philosophy, Item
402 recognizes that disclosures “will vary depending upon the facts
and circumstances,”136 and it provides examples of the types of disclo-
sures that might be mandatory under various circumstances.137  These
end of the last fiscal year, would have been covered under paragraph (a)(3)(ii). Id.
§ 229.402(a)(3)(iii).
131. See id. § 229.402(b) (requiring a “Summary Compensation Table”); see also Execu-
tive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158, 53,163–69 (Sept. 8,
2006) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 232, 239, 240, 245, 249, 274) (explaining the
requirements for the “Compensation Discussion and Analysis”).
132. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402, Instructions to Item 402(b).
133. Id. (“The Compensation Discussion and Analysis should focus on the material prin-
ciples underlying the registrant’s executive compensation policies and decisions and the
most important factors relevant to analysis of those policies and decisions.  The Compensa-
tion Discussion and Analysis shall reflect the individual circumstances of the registrant and
shall avoid boilerplate language and repetition of the more detailed information set forth
in the tables and narrative disclosures that follow.”).
134. Id. § 229.402(b)(1).
135. Id. § 229.402(b)(1)(i)–(vi).
136. Id. § 229.402(b)(2).  Item 402 provides reduced disclosure requirements for
“smaller reporting companies.” Id. § 229.402, Instructions to Item 402.
137. Id. § 229.402(b)(2).
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disclosures include, but are not limited to (1) the policies for allocat-
ing between long-term and currently paid out compensation, (2) the
policies for allocating between cash and non-cash compensation and
allocating among different forms of non-cash compensation, and (3)
the basis for allocating different forms of long-term compensation
(such as the relationship of the award to the achievement of the regis-
trant’s long-term goals, and management exposure to downside equity
risk).138  Other noteworthy disclosures include how the registrant has
structured and implemented policies to reflect each covered execu-
tive’s individual performance,139 the benchmarking of compensation
by reference to peer-group practices,140 and “[t]he role of executive
officers in determining executive compensation.”141
The SEC has retained from the prior regime an all-important
qualification on disclosures, which guts their effectiveness.  Confiden-
tial information such as target levels concerning specific quantitative
performance-related factors need not be disclosed if the compensa-
tion committee or the board of directors can show that such disclo-
sure might cause “competitive harm.”142  This provision will be
discussed below.
138. Id. § 229.402(b)(2)(i)–(iii).
139. Id. § 229.402(b)(2)(vii).
140. Id. § 229.402(b)(2)(xiv).
141. Id. § 229.402(b)(2)(xv).  The SEC enumerates several other matters that might af-
fect compensation and therefore might be subject to mandatory disclosure, including (1)
“[h]ow the determination is made as to when awards are granted, including forms of com-
pensation as options”; (2) “[w]hat specific items of corporate performance are taken into
account in setting compensation policies and making compensation decisions”; (3) “[h]ow
specific forms of compensation are structured and implemented to reflect . . . the regis-
trant’s performance, [and how] discretion can be or has been exercised”; (4) “[registrant]
policies and decisions [for recovering or adjusting] awards or payments if [the registrant’s
goals have been changed] in a manner that would reduce the size of an award or pay-
ment”; (5) “factors considered in decisions to increase or decrease compensation materi-
ally”; (6) how current or prior compensation is considered in setting the elements of
compensation (for example, “how gains from prior option or stock awards are considered
in setting retirement benefits”); (7) events that trigger payments regarding termination or
change in control; (8) “[t]he impact of the accounting and tax treatments of the particular
form of compensation”; and (9) “[t]he registrant’s equity or other security ownership re-
quirements.” Id. § 229.402(b)(2)(iv)–(vi), (viii)–(xiii).
142. Id. § 229.402, Instructions to Item 402(b) (“Registrants are not required to disclose
target levels with respect to specific quantitative or qualitative performance-related factors
considered by the compensation committee or the board of directors, or any other factors
or criteria involving confidential trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial in-
formation, the disclosure of which would result in competitive harm for the registrant.
The standard to use when determining whether disclosure would cause competitive harm
for the registrant is the same standard that would apply when a registrant requests confi-
dential treatment of confidential trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial in-
formation pursuant to Securities Act Rule 406 (17 CFR 230.406) and Exchange Act Rule
24b-2 (17 CFR 240.24b-2) . . . .  A registrant is not required to seek confidential treatment
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\69-3\MLR301.txt unknown Seq: 27 25-MAY-10 6:34
2010] TAKING STOCK—SALARY AND OPTIONS TOO 445
The CD&A narrative is only part of the disclosures that Item 402
mandates.  Item 402 also requires a series of seven compensation ta-
bles.  A Summary Compensation Table must disclose, for each of the
prior three years, each covered executive’s (1) salary, (2) bonus, (3)
stock awards, (4) option awards, (5) non-equity incentive plan com-
pensation, (6) change in pension value and nonqualified deferred
compensation earnings, (7) all other compensation, and (8) total
compensation.143  Perquisites and other personal benefits aggregating
to $10,000 or more must be disclosed in the column for “All other
compensation.”144  Also subject to mandatory reporting are “gross-
ups,” which are reimbursements to executives for taxes paid,145 and
amounts paid or accrued because of retirement, resignation, sever-
ance, or change in control.146  In five additional tables for covered
executives the company must report (1) grants of plan-based awards
for equity and non-equity incentive plans,147 (2) unvested stock
awards, and outstanding, unexercised options,148 (3) exercised op-
tions and vested stock,149 (4) pension benefits,150 and (5) nonquali-
fied deferred compensation.151  Registrants must include a summary
table reporting director compensation.152
2. Shortcomings of the Current Framework
After three years, the current framework has failed to bring exec-
utive compensation under control, even during the worst financial cri-
sis since the Great Depression.  Most shareholders have never heard
of the Compensation Discussion and Analysis.  They probably discard
proxy statements without realizing that, if they had taken a look, they
would have discovered a daunting volume of information.153  The cur-
under the procedures in Securities Act Rule 406 and Exchange Act Rule 24b-2 if it deter-
mines that the disclosure would cause competitive harm in reliance on this
instruction . . . .”).
143. Id. § 229.402(c).
144. Id. § 229.402(c)(2)(ix)(A).
145. Id. § 229.402(c)(2)(ix)(B).
146. Id. § 229.402(c)(2)(ix)(D)(1).
147. Id. § 229.402(d).
148. Id. § 229.402(f).
149. Id. § 229.402(g).
150. Id. § 229.402(h).
151. Id. § 229.402(i).
152. Id. § 229.402(k).
153. Mark Borges, an author and law practitioner in the field of executive compensa-
tion, acknowledged that, despite the SEC’s extensive disclosure requirements, sharehold-
ers tend “to skim” the CD&A. MARK A. BORGES, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION DISCLOSURE
UPDATE—2009 PROXY SEASON, PART I (2009).  Borges may have overestimated the attention
that most shareholders pay to these disclosures.
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rent framework is a bulked-up disclosure approach that requires com-
panies to overload shareholders with repetitive and, from a
layperson’s perspective, opaque information.154  For example, Co-
nocoPhillips’ compensation-related disclosures fill over fifty pages of
its 2009 Proxy Statement.155  Compensation-related disclosures in Ad-
vanced Micro Devices’ 2009 Annual Proxy Statement spans forty
pages.156  The plain English requirement succumbs to vertiginous
footnotes, arcane terminology, and incomprehensible tables and
charts.157  Challenging for lawyers, the matrix of disclosures bedevils
those unfortunate shareholders who venture into the depths of the
CD&A.  Individual shareholders are more apt to toss a proxy state-
ment into the trash than to read it.
The impulse to forego the multi-hour analysis needed to compre-
hend all this information becomes nearly irresistible when lay share-
holders realize that the compensation decisions have already been
made.  Public outrage over ballooning executive compensation in cor-
porate America has pressured some companies to include an advisory
vote on executive compensation—a so-called “say-on-pay” resolu-
tion.158  Even in such cases, few shareholders will have the fortitude to
plough through the disclosures merely to express a vote that the com-
pany will likely ignore unless shareholders mobilize and engage the
media.
Short-term institutional investors such as hedge funds that con-
trol enormous blocks of stock in most major corporations have the
expertise to understand proxy disclosures and the savvy to know an
excessive pay package when they see it.  The managers of such funds,
154. But see Sean M. Donahue, Executive Compensation: The New Executive Compensation
Disclosure Rules Do Not Result in Complete Disclosure, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 59, 82–86
(2008) (arguing that the disclosure requirements of the CD&A should be broadened to
include (1) all work performed by and all fees paid to compensation consultants; (2) de-
tailed target performance levels, despite the potential for competitive harm, but only after
the performance period has ended; (3) all earnings on deferred compensation; and (4) all
perquisites).  This proposal would accomplish little beyond padding proxy statements with
more information that shareholders would either not read or not understand even if they
tackled the narrative disclosures.  Expanding disclosure requirements wastes companies’
money and manpower.
155. CONOCOPHILLIPS, NOTICE OF 2009 ANNUAL STOCKHOLDERS MEETING MAY 13, 2009
AND PROXY STATEMENT 16–67 (2009) [hereinafter CONOCOPHILLIPS NOTICE].
156. ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES, INC., NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING OF STOCKHOLDERS
13–52 (2009) [hereinafter ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES NOTICE]; see also INTEL NOTICE, supra
note 56, at 18–46 (outlining compensation-related disclosures spanning twenty-nine R
pages).
157. See, e.g., CONOCOPHILLIPS NOTICE, supra note 155, at 36 nn.1–7. R
158. See, e.g., INTEL NOTICE, supra note 56, at 64 (“Advisory Vote on Executive Compen- R
sation”); see also infra Part VI.A.
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however, have an interest in encouraging improvident risk-taking in
the companies they own.  A reckless corporate strategy, in the short
term, may increase the market price of a stock, which is what short-
term institutional investors need to cash out with a profit.159  Once
out, they have no concern if the risky strategy later backfires and the
stock price collapses.  Thus, short-term institutional investors will not
object to the immediate vesting of stock options, a favorite compensa-
tion arrangement which encourages reckless corporate
decisionmaking.
Ironically, the disclosures tend to increase executive compensa-
tion.  Inflated executive egos demand inflated executive pay, espe-
cially when benchmarked to the compensation of rival executives.
The CD&A encourages a “my-daddy-makes-more-than-your-daddy”
mentality between peer companies.160  Nearly all major corporations
target their executive compensation levels to exceed the mean com-
pensation among their peer groups.  Companies attempt to justify
these policies by arguing that high pay attracts high quality managers.
Since nearly every company sets its compensation goals above the
mean, pay inevitably rises.  For example, Time Warner, seeking “to
attract and retain high-caliber executive[s],” generally targets direct
compensation, which it defines as salary, bonus, and equity awards, at
the seventy-fifth percentile of companies in its three peer groups.161
Intel’s policy is more complicated.  To encourage and reward ex-
ecutives for producing strong financial and operational results, and to
retain executives and to align their interests with those of stockhold-
ers, performance-based cash and equity compensation are targeted at
the sixty-fifth percentile of its peer group.162  Base salaries, which are
not performance-related, are targeted at only the twenty-fifth percen-
159. See Posting of Martin Lipton to The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Gov-
ernance and Financial Regulation, The Proposed “Shareholder Bill of Rights of 2009,”
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2009/05/12/the-proposed-
%E2%80%9Cshareholder-bill-of-rights-act-of-2009%E2%80%9D (May 12, 2009, 16:56
EST) (describing how “short-termist pressure . . . contributed significantly to the financial
and economic crises we face today”).
160. One commentator recognizes that, since executive compensation has no “spot mar-
ket,” CD&A disclosures may increase compensation by adding transparency and therefore
facilitating the efforts of companies to provide top pay to their executives.  Gordon, supra
note 82, at 697–98.  Similarly, greedy executives may demand what executives are making R
at other companies. Id. Yet, this commentator argues that the CD&A will have beneficial
effects by providing explanations and justifications for compensation packages. Id. If such
justifications are persuasive, the author argues, they will allay resentments of shareholders
and the public. Id.
161. Time Warner Notice, supra note 60, at 60–61. R
162. INTEL NOTICE, supra note 56, at 19. R
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tile of its peers.163  This policy may seem reasonable, but because the
bulk of Intel’s executive compensation packages are ostensibly per-
formance-based, Intel’s executive compensation is substantially above
its peer-group average.  In fiscal year 2008, so-called performance-
based compensation accounted for 87% of Intel’s total executive com-
pensation.164  Calculating the weighted average of salary and so-called
performance-based compensation reveals that Intel targeted its level
of executive compensation at the sixtieth percentile of its peer group,
which includes, for example, Advanced Micro Devices, its chief com-
petitor.165  Benefiting from this target, Intel CEO Paul Otellini has
seen his compensation rise dramatically from $9.8 million in 2006, to
$11.54 million in 2007, to $12.72 million in 2008.166  The recession
had no impact on Otellini’s compensation despite a reduction in In-
tel’s net income from $6.98 billion in 2007 to $5.29 billion in 2008.167
Not to be outdone by rival Intel, Advanced Micro Devices has es-
tablished a target level of executive compensation between the fiftieth
percentile and the seventy-fifth percentile of its peer group,168 which
of course includes Intel.169  Always exceeding the average compensa-
tion paid by their peers, companies compete in an executive-compen-
sation ping-pong match.
Weighted most heavily with options, equity awards account for
most executive compensation because tying compensation to a com-
pany’s stock price supposedly creates an incentive to improve per-
formance.170  By delaying the vesting of such awards over a period of
several years, some companies seek to discourage executives from
launching risky strategies that may result in ephemeral surges in stock
prices.171  When executive pay is linked to metrics such as stock price
or operating income, however, executive compensation may depend
163. Id.
164. Id. at 26.
165. Id. at 22.
166. Id. at 34.
167. See Intel Corp., Annual Statement (Form 10-K), at 56 (Feb. 23, 2009).
168. See ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES NOTICE, supra note 156, at 24. R
169. Id. at 23.  Dell targets the seventy-fifth percentile of the compensation of its peer
group, which includes both Advanced Micro Devices and Intel. DELL, NOTICE OF ANNUAL
MEETING AND PROXY STATEMENT 20 (2009) [hereinafter DELL NOTICE].  Intel includes Dell
in its peer group. See INTEL NOTICE, supra note 56, at 22. R
170. See, e.g., INTEL NOTICE, supra note 56, at 19 (explaining that Intel’s objective in R
awarding stock equity as compensation is to align the interests of Intel’s executives with the
interests of its shareholders).
171. See id. (“Annual equity awards generally vest in 25% annual installments over four
years.  Long-term equity awards generally vest in full on the fifth anniversary of the grant
date.”).
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on market forces that have little, if anything, to do with managerial
performance.172
To reflect executive performance more accurately, performance-
based criteria for compensation must be qualitative.  The compensa-
tion committee must assess the contributions of the executive, exclud-
ing external forces such as market conditions.  The assessment of an
executive’s annual performance might take into account the execu-
tive’s innovative ideas and initiatives, problem solving, crisis manage-
ment, and consensus building.  All these performance measures are
subjective and hard to evaluate.  Nevertheless, shareholders would
want to know the reasons for judgments made by directors.  They will
not find them in the CD&A.  Item 402 does not require the disclosure
of subjective assessments.  Furthermore, detailed performance met-
rics, whether qualitative or quantitative, likely fit under the Item 402
reporting exemption for confidential information that might cause
“competitive harm.”173
By failing to disclose performance standards, companies camou-
flage the reasons for their compensation decisions, and shareholders
find it difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate those decisions.  Per-
formance-based goals that do appear in the CD&A are easily manipu-
lated to ensure robust pay raises.  Directors may set performance goals
at levels that executives are almost certain to attain.  A company will
declare self-righteously in its CD&A that it bases executive compensa-
tion primarily on performance-based measures because they align the
interests of shareholders with executives.174  Equity grants—options
and particularly restricted stock—are supposedly performance-based,
but companies turn them into guaranteed windfalls.  If the value of
the stock and options falls, new bundles of equity will be granted in
succeeding years—restricted stock at lower market prices and options
at lower strike prices.175  Though vesting may be delayed, sooner or
172. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. R
173. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2006), Instructions to Item 402(b) (“Registrants are not
required to disclose target levels with respect to specific quantitative or qualitative perform-
ance-related factors . . . or any other factors or criteria involving confidential trade secrets
or confidential commercial or financial information . . . .”).
174. See, e.g., DELL NOTICE, supra note 169, at 18 (expressing the goal of “[h]eavily R
weighting the compensation package towards long-term, performance-dependent incen-
tives to better align the interests of executives with stockholders”); INTEL NOTICE, supra
note 56, at 19 (highlighting the objective of aligning executive officers’ interests with those R
of stockholders).
175. See, e.g., DELL NOTICE, supra note 169, at 32–33 tbls. (showing that the exercise R
prices of options granted in 2009 had substantially lower exercise prices than did unexer-
cised options granted in prior years); INTEL NOTICE, supra note 56, at 34, 40–41 tbls. (same R
with respect to Intel options awarded in 2009); Time Warner Notice, supra note 60, at 83
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later the stock will rise, and management will prosper despite its
failures.
In the final analysis, the “principles-based” disclosure approach
fails to provide the information that shareholders need to evaluate the
propriety of compensation decisions.  Despite the best intentions of
the SEC, the system, in practice, has devolved into an intricate sham.
Companies have defeated the aspirations of “principles-based” disclo-
sure by reverting to a more sophisticated brand of boilerplate.
The mandatory disclosures have not tempered the brazenness of
some companies to overpay their top executives.  Bank of America is a
startling example.  Agencies of the U.S. government agreed to absorb
90% of losses exceeding $10 billion resulting from a $118 billion pool
of Bank of America’s troubled assets.176  The Department of the Trea-
sury also committed $20 billion in TARP funds to rescue the bank
from the brink of financial ruin.177  The bank’s earnings plummeted
from about $15 billion in 2007 to about $4 billion in 2008, and its
stock price plunged from $41.26 at the end of 2007 to $14.08 at the
end of 2008.178  In response to this financial distress, the bank slashed
the quarterly dividend on its common stock from a high of $2.56179 to
a lonely penny per share.180  Nevertheless, Bank of America must have
regarded its troubles as a minor setback: CEO Kenneth Lewis’s total
compensation in 2008 was nearly $10 million, and Joe Price, the Chief
Financial Officer (“CFO”), made over $4 million.181
Some would argue that, in a time of near financial collapse, Bank
of America needed to maintain multimillion dollar compensation
levels to retain experienced management.  Cynical shareholders
might complain, however, that the company would benefit from rid-
(explaining that the fair value of restricted stock and restricted stock units represents the
average of the high and low prices of Time Warner common stock on the grant date).
176. See BANK OF AMERICA CORP., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 58 (2009) [hereinafter BANK OF
AMERICA 2008 ANNUAL REPORT] (explaining that “the U.S. government has agreed in prin-
ciple to provide protection against the possibility of unusually large losses on $118.0 billion
in selected capital markets exposure”); see also Peter Barnes & Joanna Ossinger, BofA to Get
$20B More from TARP, Plus Backstop on $118B, FOX BUS., Jan. 16, 2009, http://www.foxbusi-
ness.com/story/markets/industries/finance/bofa-shares-falter-reports-needs-new-tarp-
money/ (noting that 90% of Bank of America’s eligible losses exceeding $10 billion will be
absorbed by the government).
177. Barnes & Ossinger, supra note 176. R
178. BANK OF AMERICA 2008 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 176, at 28. R
179. Kate Gibson, S&P 500 Investors Face Dismal Dividends in 2009, WALL ST. J. MARKET
WATCH, Jan. 16, 2009, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/bank-of-americas-dividend-cut-
one-of-many-facing-investors.
180. BANK OF AMERICA 2008 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 176, at 59. R
181. BANK OF AMERICA CORP., NOTICE OF 2009 ANNUAL MEETING OF STOCKHOLDERS 27
(2009).
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ding itself of the very managers who led it to the event horizon of a
financial black hole.  Such shareholders might argue that managers
responsible for the company’s distress should receive a symbolic dol-
lar for their trouble.  A dollar would be one hundred times the
dividend.
The SEC’s disclosure system does not shield directors from the
pressures, both financial and psychological, that affect their decision-
making.  They cloak their decisions in self-serving platitudes in the
CD&A that purport to align management and shareholder interests,
and they establish performance-based compensation arrangements
that are supposed to be blind to undue influence.  All the disclosures
imaginable will not repair the broken fiduciary model.
Despite the inadequacies of the disclosure approach, a fastidious
shareholder might defy the odds, analyze the proxy disclosures, and
discover objectionable decisions.  Such a shareholder might seek a ju-
dicial remedy.  As shown below, however, the courts have been inhos-
pitable to such claims.182
IV. APPROACH THREE: LITIGATION
The litigation approach would initially seem promising.  The ju-
dicial system is notorious for granting relief to those who press even
the most inconsequential grievances.183  One would expect such a wel-
coming judiciary to provide a remedy for valid claims of corporate
waste and breach of fiduciary duty.  The courts, however, turn un-
characteristically conservative when shareholders, or government
agencies acting on their behalf, challenge the conduct of corporate
directors.  Judges use procedural devices to rid themselves of such
cases before plaintiffs have the opportunity to reveal director neglect
or complicity in authorizing the payment of windfalls to executives.
Even when courts pay attention, they usually find director misconduct
not quite bad enough to justify judicial intervention.  Once having
condoned the directors’ misconduct, the courts will not even consider
182. See infra Part IV.
183. In a recent class action, the California Superior Court for the County of Los Ange-
les approved a settlement agreement awarding up to $22.50 to iPod purchasers who would
certify the following under penalty of perjury: “I declare that I experienced scratching of
my iPod nano that impaired my use or enjoyment of my iPod nano.”  Apple First Genera-
tion iPod nano Class Action Settlement Reminder: Claim Filing Deadline June 10, 2009,
Claim Form Attached (April 2009) (on file with author).  A judicial system generous
enough to allow settlement of the claims of scratched iPod users should embrace claims of
shareholders charging executives with plundering corporations for tens and even hun-
dreds of millions of dollars.
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dizzying numbers that stun ordinary people but not the judicial
temperament.
A. Contours of the Business Judgment Rule
The primary culprit is the business judgment rule.  Designed to
protect officers and directors from shareholder meddling, this rule
has stymied challenges to excessive executive compensation.  A nota-
ble case applying the business judgment rule, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Pe-
troleum Co.,184 involved a hostile tender offer launched by Mesa for
Unocal stock.  The Unocal court characterized the business judgment
rule as “a ‘presumption that in making a business decision the direc-
tors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in
the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company.’”185  As long as directors do not act in their self-interests
and have even a tenuous basis to support their decision, the rule pre-
vents courts from evaluating the merits of that decision.  The court
emphasized that “[a] hallmark of the business judgment rule is that a
court will not substitute its judgment for that of the board if the lat-
ter’s decision can be ‘attributed to any rational business purpose.’”186
Unocal makes clear how completely courts defer to corporate
decisionmakers.
B. Justifications for the Rule
Courts have articulated several rationales for the business judg-
ment rule.  Some are more persuasive than others.187  One rather
weak justification is that shareholders know or should know the risk-
taking profiles of corporate directors before buying stock.  Such share-
holders, therefore, voluntarily accept the risk of faulty judgments the
directors ultimately make.188  This justification, however, applies
equally to anyone hired to perform a service, and yet no equivalent to
the business judgment rule protects doctors, lawyers, shoemakers, or
184. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
185. Id. at 954 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
186. Id. (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)).
187. See generally D.A. Jeremy Telman, The Business Judgment Rule, Disclosure, and Executive
Compensation, 81 TUL. L. REV. 829, 839–63 (2007) (criticizing the rationales offered for the
business judgment rule and concluding that “the Rule is a poorly understood piece of legal
doctrine”).
188. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) (listing risk of bad business
judgment voluntarily undertaken by shareholders as a rationale for the business judgment
rule).  The court also pointed out that judges should not second-guess directors who must
often make decisions under pressure with imperfect information. Id. at 886.  Many profes-
sionals, however, such as a surgeon encountering a crisis during an operation, also make
decisions under pressure.  Yet surgeons are held to a negligence standard of malpractice.
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hairdressers.  Judge Learned Hand has provided a response to this
criticism by observing that “[d]irectors are not specialists, like lawyers
or doctors. . . . They are the general advisors of the business, and if
they faithfully give such ability as they have to their charge, it would
not be lawful to hold them liable.”189  Judge Hand’s explanation goes
only so far.  Some inside directors hold themselves out as experts in
running the affairs of the corporations they control.  After years at the
corporate helm, their experience and knowledge are analogous to the
expertise of doctors or lawyers.
Ironically, another rationale, which clashes with the first, argues
that judges and juries lack the knowledge to question the expert busi-
ness judgments of directors.  The court in In re Caremark International
Inc. Derivative Litigation190 reasoned that a more stringent rule “would
expose directors to substantive second guessing by ill-equipped judges
or juries, which would, in the long-run, be injurious to investor inter-
ests.”191  Judges and juries, however, evaluate conflicting expert testi-
mony in complex professional malpractice actions.  They analyze
economic data in antitrust lawsuits and choose between rival statistical
methodologies in discrimination cases.  It is unclear why a judge or
layperson can decide such cases more easily than those challenging
business decisions.192
A more convincing justification for the business judgment rule is
that exposing such decisions to a penetrating level of scrutiny would
inhibit corporate risk-taking.193  To maximize shareholder value, di-
rectors must take chances.  This justification for the rule becomes
189. Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (exonerating director from
liability for failure of corporate enterprise).
190. 698 A.2d 959, 971–72 (Del. Ch. 1996) (characterizing as “extremely weak” allega-
tions that directors breached duty of due care by failing to institute corrective measures for
regulatory violations and criminal conduct of drug company because the record did not
support the conclusion that the directors lacked good faith in carrying out their supervi-
sory responsibilities or that they knowingly acquiesced in a violation).
191. Id. at 967; see also E. Norman Veasey & Julie M.S. Seitz, The Business Judgment Rule in
the Revised Model Act, the Trans Union Case and the ALI Project—A Strange Porridge, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 1483, 1485 (1985) (noting that courts are not qualified to make corporate business
decisions).
192. See Telman, supra note 187, at 841–42 (observing that judges rely on expert testi- R
mony in resolving complex issues raised in non-business litigation).
193. The court in In re Caremark observed:
It is doubtful that we want business men and women to be encouraged to make
decisions as hypothetical persons of ordinary judgment and prudence might.  The
corporate form gets its utility in large part from its ability to allow diversified
investors to accept greater investment risk.  If those in charge of the corporation
are to be adjudged personally liable for losses on the basis of a substantive judg-
ment based upon what an [sic] persons of ordinary or average judgment and
average risk assessment talent regard as “prudent” “sensible” or even “rational,”
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even more persuasive when one recognizes the prominent role that
guesswork plays in business decisionmaking.  A doctor treats a condi-
tion with medications recommended in the Physicians’ Desk Reference; a
lawyer responds to a complaint with a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim.  In both circumstances, the approaches are established
by professional standards.  When a soft drink company decides to
manufacture and market a new age beverage, it is not relying on a
manual or code.  Directors are paid to rely on their informed
hunches.  They are expected to outpace their competitors.  Share-
holders should not complain when a calculated gamble does not work
out.
There is another sensible rationale for the business judgment
rule.  The stock of a publicly traded corporation may be dispersed
among tens of thousands of shareholders.194  Any may commence a
derivative suit.  If the judiciary welcomed the claims of disgruntled
shareholders, every corporate decision would be captive to their
whims.195
C. Abuse of the Rule
The business judgment rule applies to claims of excessive execu-
tive compensation.196  As a result, the business judgment rule has
such persons will have a strong incentive at the margin to authorize less risky
investment projects.
698 A.2d at 967–68 n.16; see also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985)
(“The business judgment rule exists to protect and promote the full and free exercise of
the managerial power granted to Delaware directors.”). But see Telman, supra note 187, at R
848 (noting that directors are protected from personal liability by doctrines apart from the
business judgment rule, such as the right to indemnification).  Alternative forms of legal
cover for directors, however, do not invalidate the policy of encouraging corporate risk-
taking.  One might argue about the method, but the need is compelling to provide some
effective protection for directors.  Moreover, indemnification provides a circuitous and
therefore inefficient route to protect directors.  If directors should not be liable for certain
business decisions, the law should absolve them of responsibility rather than hold them
liable but permit the corporation to indemnify or insure them.
194. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 29, at 47–50 (discussing the inconsequential equity R
holdings of passive investors in major corporations).
195. But see Telman, supra note 187, at 849 (noting that at least fourteen states require R
shareholders with small equity interests to post bonds to cover corporate expenses and
attorneys’ fees when instituting derivative suits).
196. In addition to the justifications already discussed, a specific rationale for applying
the rule to compensation claims is that the law should afford directors broad discretion so
that corporations can attract top-level talent. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906
A.2d 27, 75 (Del. 2006) (“The approval of the NFT [no-fault termination] provisions in the
OEA [Ovitz Employment Agreement] had a rational business purpose: to induce Ovitz to
leave CAA [Creative Artists Agency], at what would otherwise be a considerable cost to
him, in order to join Disney.”); Jennifer S. Martin, The House of Mouse and Beyond: Assessing
the SEC’s Efforts to Regulate Executive Compensation, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 481, 499, 506–07
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shielded directors from claims challenging even the most egregious
compensation decisions.197
People v. Grasso198 is a striking example of how the courts use the
business judgment rule to reject claims of excessive executive compen-
sation.  Richard Grasso was the CEO and Chairman of the Board of
the NYSE, which was then a not-for-profit corporation.199  During his
tenure from 1995 until his resignation in September 2003, the Board
of Directors lavished him with over $200 million in compensation.200
Outrage over Grasso’s exorbitant compensation forced him to re-
sign.201  After an internal investigation, the Interim Chairman of the
NYSE requested, in writing, that the SEC and New York State Attorney
(2007) (criticizing the decision in In re Walt Disney Co. for concluding that “[w]here the
payments at issue are related to rational business attempts to attract executive talent, there
is no waste”).
197. See, e.g., Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F.2d 733, 743 (7th Cir. 1979) (affirming dismissal of
the complaint alleging that Sears directors wasted corporate assets by issuing repriced op-
tions to replace previously issued “underwater” options); In re Walt Disney Co., 906 A.2d at
39–41, 58 (upholding a $130 million severance package to Michael Ovitz after only four-
teen months of largely unsatisfactory service to Disney despite substantial evidence that
Michael Eisner rammed the agreement containing the severance package through the
compensation committee and board of directors); Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207,
1214–15 (Del. 1996) (affirming dismissal of the claims that directors breached the duty of
care and wasted corporate assets by entering into an employment agreement with a CEO
entitling him to $20 million in the event of constructive discharge); Mlinarcik v. E.E.
Wehrung Parking, Inc., 620 N.E.2d 181, 183–84 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (rejecting share-
holders’ claim, despite expert witness’s testimony, that two directors of the closely held
corporation voted to pay themselves a total of $18,000 annual compensation for services
worth between $576 and $2000); ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTAND-
ING CORPORATE LAW 241 (2d ed. 2004) (concluding that “executive compensation cases in
publicly traded corporations are rarely successful”); Telman, supra note 187, at 872 (noting R
that the courts rarely sustain shareholder claims alleging excessive executive compensa-
tion); Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: An
Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 605 (2001) (concluding that, although share-
holder compensation cases, particularly those involving close corporations, are more suc-
cessful than widely perceived, “derivative suits do not generally appear to be a strong check
on executive pay,” and that if shareholders “want to challenge executive pay more force-
fully, we believe that they will need to find alternative methods of policing executive com-
pensation practices”); see also infra notes 198–231 and accompanying text. But see R
Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 216–17 (Del. 1979) (holding that shareholders’ com-
plaint met minimal pleading standards in alleging that option grants to key employees,
including a number of directors, constituted corporate waste).
198. 893 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 2008).
199. Id. at 105–06.
200. Id.; Editorial, Chasing Mr. Grasso’s Millions, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2004, at A22 (“The
story of how Mr. Grasso earned more than $200 million in less than a decade leading the
nonprofit stock exchange seems to involve two of the more destructive trends of the recent
Wall Street bubble: shameless C.E.O. greed and a total breakdown in corporate
governance.”).
201. Grasso, 893 N.E.2d at 107.
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General pursue the matter further.202  The New York State Attorney
General at that time, Eliot Spitzer, embarked on a crusade to compel
Grasso to disgorge some of those funds.203
The Attorney General commenced a lawsuit, alleging six causes
of action against Grasso.204  All of the claims asserted that payments
contemplated under a 2003 compensation agreement between Grasso
and the NYSE were unreasonably excessive, and therefore contrary to
provisions of the Not-For-Profit Corporation Law.205  Four of these
claims arose from common law,206 and the remaining two claims were
statutory.207
The complaint pointed out that beginning in 1995, Grasso re-
ceived an annual salary of $1.4 million plus annual bonuses that esca-
lated from $900,000 in 1995 to $10.6 million in 2002.208  Even more
striking, Grasso’s total compensation of $130.3 million from
2000–2002, including salary, bonuses, and benefits, nearly equaled the
NYSE’s total profits of $132.8 million for the same period.209
Given this backdrop, the lawsuit challenged the 2003 compensa-
tion agreement between Grasso and the NYSE.210  To compensate
Grasso for future work and to reward him for past accomplishments
for which he had already been handsomely compensated, this agree-
ment provided Grasso with a lump sum payment of $139.5 million
supplemented by another $48 million payable over four years.211
202. Id.
203. Id.; see also Chasing Mr. Grasso’s Millions, supra note 200 (“When they were not being R
duped, the Wall Street notables on the exchange’s board were being intimidated, accord-
ing to Mr. Spitzer’s allegations.  Mr. Grasso regulated the trading firms many of his board
members ran—a sordid conflict of interest, since resolved by the exchange’s reforms.”).
204. Grasso, 893 N.E.2d at 107.
205. Id. at 106–07. Numerous Sections of the Not-For-Profit Corporation Law empow-
ered the Attorney General to commence actions to enforce shareholder rights including
claims of corporate waste and breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 108.
206. Id. at 107.  These claims alleged (1) a constructive trust, (2) payment had and re-
ceived, (3) the right to restitution, and (4) a violation of the prohibition of loans to of-
ficers. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 106; see also Joseph E. Bachelder III, New York Courts Dismiss ‘Grasso’ Compensa-
tion Case, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 27, 2008, at 3 (explaining that “the compensation and benefits for
Mr. Grasso expensed over the period of 2000–2002 equaled slightly less than 100 percent
of the New York Stock Exchange’s (NYSE) net income over this same period” (citation
omitted)).  Bachelder suggests, “This case appeared to offer an ideal opportunity for New
York courts to address the issue of what is reasonable compensation.  It had all the ear-
marks of an egregious case of overpayment of compensation to an executive together with
evidence of dubious corporate behavior in the setting of that compensation.” Id.
209. Bachelder, supra note 208, at 3. R
210. Grasso, 893 N.E.2d at 106.
211. Id. Grasso never collected the $48 million payout.  Jenny Anderson, Stock Exchange’s
Former Chief Wins Court Battle to Keep Pay, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2008, at A1.
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The complaint did not merely challenge the excessiveness of the
2003 compensation agreement.  It also charged that the agreement
resulted from overreaching and deception.212  Grasso had hand-
picked members of the Compensation Committee, some of whom
were subject to his regulatory authority.213  He even allegedly inti-
mated to a Compensation Committee member that if the member
supported the 2003 agreement, Grasso would assist him in his deal-
ings with the NYSE.214  These members of the Compensation Commit-
tee approved Grasso’s compensation package, although it violated
NYSE benchmarks.215  In addition, the complaint alleged that the in-
formation provided to the NYSE’s Compensation Committee and
Board of Directors about the compensation package was “inaccurate,
incomplete and misleading.”216
Grasso and his cronies also allegedly committed procedural im-
proprieties.  Several board members disapproved of the $139.5 mil-
lion lump sum payment.217  Because of these concerns, the proposal
to approve that payment was excluded from the agenda of the August
7, 2003, meetings of the Compensation Committee and the Board of
Directors.218  The complaint alleged that, as a result of the removal of
this item from the agenda, neither corporate counsel nor opponents
of the payment attended these meetings.219  Yet, approval of the com-
pensation package was belatedly inserted into the agendas of the Au-
gust 7 meetings, and the board approved the payment, though its
members allegedly had no opportunity to review the details of the
compensation package before voting to approve it.220
Grasso moved to dismiss the four common-law claims alleged in
the Attorney General’s complaint.221  New York Supreme Court Jus-
212. Grasso, 893 N.E.2d at 106.
213. Id.
214. People v. Grasso, 836 N.Y.S.2d 40, 55 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (Mazzarelli, J., dissent-
ing), aff’d, 893 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 2008).
215. Grasso, 893 N.E.2d at 106.  In 1996, the Compensation Committee adopted a for-
mal policy to align executive compensation with that paid to senior management of large,
for-profit companies. Id. at 106 n.2.  The purpose of this policy was to attract “world class
talent.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Grasso’s compensation package, however,
exceeded the benchmark by 64% in 1999, by 141% in 2000, and by 65% in 2001. Id. at
106.





221. Id. at 107.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\69-3\MLR301.txt unknown Seq: 40 25-MAY-10 6:34
458 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 69:419
tice Ramos denied the motion.222  He offered this thoughtful explana-
tion for his decision:
The investing community relies on the integrity of the
market as well as the NYSE’s governance and regulatory
structure which serves it.  It is this regulatory power pos-
sessed by the NYSE which the Attorney General alleges Mr.
Grasso used, or refrained from using, to the detriment of the
independence of the NYSE Board and its Compensation
Committee. . . .  The interests of investors, individual or insti-
tutional, are the proper subjects of the Attorney General’s
responsibility.223
The Appellate Division reversed the order of Justice Ramos, hold-
ing that the Attorney General’s authority was limited to statutory
claims, and therefore, that the Attorney General lacked authority to
assert common-law claims.224
Affirming the Appellate Division’s order dismissing the com-
plaint, the New York State Court of Appeals relied on the business
judgment rule.225  The court observed that the Not-For-Profit Corpo-
ration Law “provides that officers and directors must discharge ‘the
duties of their respective positions in good faith and with that degree
of diligence, care and skill which ordinarily prudent men would exer-
cise under similar circumstances in like positions.’”226  Officers and
directors who meet these duties are immune from liability.227  The
court concluded that the Attorney General did not allege bad faith or
knowledge of wrongdoing sufficient to overcome the business judg-
ment rule.228  Thus, the court found the common-law claims legally
insufficient “however unreasonable [the] compensation may seem on
its face.”229
222. Id.; People v. Grasso, 816 N.Y.S.2d 863, 877 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006), rev’d, 836 N.Y.S.2d
40 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007), aff’d, 893 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 2008).
223. Grasso, 816 N.Y.S.2d at 871.
224. Grasso, 836 N.Y.S.2d at 53.  Justice Mazzarelli dissented. Id. (Mazzarelli, J., dissent-
ing).  She argued that the Attorney General had parens patriae authority to protect the
public from a loss of confidence in the NYSE, which is vital to the national economy. Id. at
56.
225. Grasso, 893 N.E.2d at 108.
226. Id. (citation omitted).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 109–10.
229. Id. at 110. The two remaining statutory claims did not survive for long.  The Appel-
late Division dismissed them in a subsequent decision because the NYSE had merged into a
for-profit corporation.  People v. Grasso, 861 N.Y.S.2d 627, 636 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).  De-
rived from the not-for-profit status of the NYSE, the Attorney General’s jurisdiction to pros-
ecute these claims lapsed with the merger. Id.  The court stressed that, after the merger,
the public interest was no longer at stake in the lawsuit. Id. at 639–40.
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The court was right to a point.  The law should not provide a
forum for quibbling shareholders.  Decisions setting executive com-
pensation, however, are not ordinary business judgments because the
interests of shareholders and management clash.  The misconduct al-
leged in Grasso was particularly egregious.  The Attorney General, rep-
resenting the public interest, alleged wrongdoing that the courts
should have scrutinized and remedied.  Instead the case was dismissed
on pretrial motions.230  If the courts had condemned Grasso’s tactics
and compelled him to return the ransom he had extracted from the
NYSE, other corporate executives might refrain from wringing every
last million out of their corporations.  They might settle for a paltry
million or two.  Instead the courts in Grasso seemed too squeamish to
confront the alleged abuses.  Although the case began with a public
outcry, by the time Attorney General Andrew Cuomo announced his
intention not to institute a futile appeal from the Appellate Division’s
order dismissing the statutory causes of action, the public’s anger—
after five years of litigation—had faded to a grumble of discontent.231
D. Pre-Suit Demands on the Board of Directors
To commence derivative suits, shareholders must either make de-
mand on the board of directors to institute legal proceedings and be
refused, or show that demand is excused.232  In In re Citigroup Inc.
Shareholder Derivative Litigation,233 shareholders brought a derivative
suit arising from massive losses sustained by Citigroup in the current
financial crisis.234  Excusing demand in this case, the court articulated
the relevant legal standard.235
In In re Citigroup Inc., shareholders charged certain officers and
directors of the financial giant with wasting $2.7 billion of its funds by
authorizing the purchase of subprime loans.236  The suit also alleged
230. Grasso, 893 N.E.2d at 107–08.
231. See Anderson, supra note 211.  New York State Attorney General Andrew Cuomo, R
the successor to Eliot Spitzer, issued a statement that he would not appeal the Appellate
Division’s decision to the New York Court of Appeals. Id.  This statement effectively ended
the Grasso litigation saga.
232. See infra notes 235–58 and accompanying text. R
233. 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009).
234. Id. at 111.
235. See id. at 120–21, 138 (articulating the requirement of either making a pre-suit
demand or pleading facts showing that demand is futile).
236. Id. at 111. The complaint also asserted claims of corporate waste against certain
officers and directors for (1) authorizing Citigroup’s stock repurchase program in the first
quarter of 2007, which resulted in the repurchase of shares at inflated prices, and (2)
allowing the company to invest in structured investment vehicles, which failed to pay off
maturing debt. Id. at 111–12.
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that a severance package provided to departing CEO Charles Prince
wasted corporate funds.237  The severance package included $68 mil-
lion in bonus, salary, and accumulated stock holdings.238  It also pro-
vided Prince with an office, an administrative assistant, and a car and
driver.239  In exchange, Prince agreed to standard provisions, includ-
ing non-competition, non-solicitation, and non-disparagement
clauses, and a release of claims against Citigroup.240  Shareholders ar-
gued that this compensation package was grossly excessive given that
Prince allegedly shared blame for Citigroup’s massive losses.241
The court noted that the board of directors of a corporation is
empowered to commence lawsuits on behalf of the corporation.242
The right of shareholders to bring derivative suits arises when they
plead facts showing that the board of directors wrongfully refused a
demand to commence an action.243  Demand on the board is excused
when there is a reasonable doubt that the directors are disinterested
in the lawsuit or that the business judgment rule would shield them
from liability.244
To overcome the business judgment rule, a claim of corporate
waste must allege that the challenged compensation was unconsciona-
bly disproportionate.245  Expressing a “reasonable doubt” that the
board could defeat the claim that Prince’s severance package was un-
conscionable, the court excused pre-suit demand.246  This result did
not mean that the shareholders would prevail.  The shareholders
merely survived the motion to dismiss.
237. Id. at 111–12.
238. Id. at 138.




242. Id. at 120.
243. Id.
244. Id.; see Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814–15 (Del. 1984) (holding that demand is
excused when there is a reasonable doubt that the directors are independent and disinter-
ested and that the business judgment rule would protect them), overruled in part on other
grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
245. In re Citigroup Inc., 964 A.2d at 138 (citing Brehm, 746 A.2d at 262 n.56); see also
Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1214–15 (Del. 1996) (dismissing claims that directors
breached the duty of care and wasted corporate assets by entering into an employment
agreement with the CEO entitling him to $20 million in the event of constructive dis-
charge), overruled by Brehm, 746 A.2d 244.
246. In re Citigroup Inc., 964 A.2d at 138.
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The pre-suit demand requirement scuttled a claim of corporate
waste brought in Zupnick v. Goizueta.247  In that case, Coca-Cola’s
board of directors granted company CEO, Roberto Goizueta, options
to purchase one million shares of Coca-Cola’s common stock at the
market price on the date the options were issued.248  The options
were not exercisable for one year, after which they vested over the
next three years.249
Plaintiff commenced a shareholder’s derivative suit, alleging that
the board awarded the options to Goizueta for past performance for
which he had already been generously compensated.250  The com-
plaint emphasized that Goizueta would receive the options even if he
chose to retire immediately.251  Conceding these points, the board re-
sponded that the option grant was a reasonable bonus for Goizueta’s
outstanding prior service to the company.252  During his stewardship
as CEO beginning in March 1981, the value of Coca-Cola stock had
increased by nearly $69 billion.253
The directors moved to dismiss the complaint because the plain-
tiff had not made a pre-suit demand on the board.254  The plaintiff
argued that demand was excused because the board would not have
sued itself.255  The court found this argument unpersuasive.256  It rea-
soned that a non-fraudulent transaction would rarely, if ever, meet the
legal standard for a claim of corporate waste.257  Because the business
247. 698 A.2d 384, 385 (Del. Ch. 1997); see also Aronson, 473 A.2d at 808–09, 818 (grant-
ing defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to make demand on the board
of directors where the board was charged with entering into a lucrative lifetime consulting
agreement with a retiring controlling shareholder and providing him with $225,000 of
interest free loans, which he repaid after the suit was commenced).
248. Zupnick, 698 A.2d at 385.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 386.
251. Id. at 385.  Goizueta elected to continue as CEO despite his right to retire and
receive the options. Id. at 385–86.
252. Id. at 386.
253. Id. at 388.  The court did not discuss how much of the increase in the value of
Coca-Cola stock was attributable to Goizueta’s leadership rather than to general market
conditions, growth of the soft drink industry, or other factors. See id.
254. Id. at 386.
255. See id. (“[The plaintiff claimed] that the option grant itself was wasteful and not
protected by the business judgment rule [and that he was excused from the demand
requirement].”).
256. Id. at 387.
257. See id. (“‘But rarest of all—and indeed like Nessie, possibly non existent—would be
the case of disinterested business people making non fraudulent deals . . . that meet the
legal standard of waste!’” (quoting Steiner v. Meyerson, Civ. A. No. 13139, 1995 WL
441999, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 19, 1995))).
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judgment rule would almost certainly shield the directors against such
a claim, the court did not excuse pre-suit demand.258
V. APPROACH FOUR: TAX INCENTIVES
The absence of a judicial watchdog has emboldened the corpo-
rate wolves.  Tax policy is a tool that the federal government uses to
encourage behavior deemed socially desirable.  The federal tax code
therefore contains incentives to shape compensation practices.
A. Section 162(m)
Public outcries over skyrocketing executive compensation
spurred Congress to enact Section 162(m) in 1993.259  The purpose of
the Section was to discourage corporations from providing ever-in-
creasing levels of executive pay, while encouraging them to link pay to
performance.260  Unfortunately, Section 162(m) has failed to achieve
either purpose.
1. Essential Provisions
Section 162(m) redefined eligibility for the federal tax deduction
for executive pay.  Before passage of this provision, the reasonable
costs of compensation were deductible as business expenses.261  The
reasonableness standard had been used principally to disallow the de-
duction of dividends paid by closely held corporations.262  Virtually all
executive compensation was deemed reasonable and therefore
deductible.
Section 162(m) introduced a cap of $1 million on the deductibil-
ity of executive pay.263  The Section provides an unlimited exception
for performance-based compensation paid to the CEO and the next
four most highly paid executives of publicly held companies.264  To
258. Id. at 389.  The complaint was dismissed for two reasons—failing to allege a cogni-
zable ground for corporate waste and failing to justify why a pre-suit demand was not made
on the board. Id.
259. I.R.C. § 162(m) (2006); see H.R. REP. NO. 103-111, at 646 (1993) (“Recently, the
amount of compensation received by corporate executives has been the subject of scrutiny
and criticism.”).
260. H.R. REP. NO. 103-111, at 646 (expecting that “excessive compensation will be re-
duced if the deduction for compensation (other than performance-based compensation)
paid to the top executives of publicly held corporations is limited to $1 million per year”).
261. Id. (observing that reasonableness “is determined on a case-by-case basis” but that
the standard “has been used primarily to limit payments by closely-held companies where
non-deductible dividends may be disguised as deductible compensation”).
262. Id.
263. I.R.C. § 162(m)(1).
264. Id. § 162(m)(3)–(4).
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qualify as performance-based, compensation has to meet several con-
ditions.  The compensation has to be payable for the attainment of
objective performance goals determined by a compensation commit-
tee composed of two or more outside directors.265  In addition, the
material terms of the compensation arrangement must be disclosed to
shareholders and approved by a majority vote of the shareholders.266
Before paying a covered executive the performance-based compensa-
tion, the compensation committee has to certify that the executive has
met the performance goals.267
Various forms of delayed equity compensation, including stock
options, restricted stock, restricted stock units, and stock appreciation
rights, are generally considered performance-linked under Section
162(m).268  Such awards qualify for the unlimited tax deduction be-
cause they presumably rise and fall with the financial success of the
company and because the success of the company may be attributed,
at least in part, to the performance of its principal officers.  Neither
in-the-money options nor options subject to repricing qualify for the
unlimited deduction because they are only loosely tied to perform-
ance.269  At-the-money options, out-of-the-money options, and stock
265. Id. § 162(m)(4)(C).  This Subsection provides:
The term “applicable employee remuneration” shall not include any remunera-
tion payable solely on account of the attainment of one or more performance
goals, but only if—(i) the performance goals are determined by a compensation
committee of the board of directors of the taxpayer which is composed solely of 2
or more outside directors, (ii) the material terms under which the remuneration
is to be paid, including the performance goals, are disclosed to shareholders and
approved by a majority of the vote in a separate shareholder vote before the pay-
ment of such remuneration, and (iii) before any payment of such remuneration,
the compensation committee referred to in clause (i) certifies that the perform-
ance goals and any other material terms were in fact satisfied.
Id.; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2) (1996) (providing that “[q]ualified performance-
based compensation must be paid solely on account of the attainment of one or more
preestablished, objective performance goals”).
266. I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C)(ii).
267. Id. § 162(m)(4)(C)(iii). Certification was not required for out-of-the-money, at-
the-money options or stock appreciation rights. H.R. REP. NO. 103-111, at 648–49.
268. See H.R. REP. NO. 103-111, at 648 (noting that stock options and stock appreciation
rights generally qualify as performance-based compensation); David M. Schizer, Executives
and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive Compatibility, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 440,
468 n.101 (2000) (“The legislative history suggests that [the § 162(m)] performance-pay
exception generally includes executive stock options.” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 103-111, at
648)).
269. H.R. REP. NO. 103-111, at 649 (noting that if an executive is protected against a
decrease in the value of the stock, the equity-based compensation is not covered by the
performance-based exception); Murphy, supra note 81, at 863–64 (noting that “for option R
plans to qualify as performance-based compensation, the options must not be in the
money when granted”).
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appreciation rights, all of which are presumptively tied to perform-
ance, qualify for deductibility even without committee certification.270
Bonuses paid under plans with objective performance-based criteria
also qualify for the unlimited tax deduction.271  Salaries and discre-
tionary bonuses, however, are subject to the $1 million deductibility
limit.272
2. Backfire
Research has revealed that people are risk averse.  They prefer
the sure thing to speculation.  Offered the choice between the guaran-
teed payment of a dollar and the 50% chance of the payment of two
dollars, most people will take the guaranteed dollar.273  The two
choices are equivalent in the value of the expected payout, but most
people do not want to risk getting nothing.  To induce an individual
to accept the more risky alternative, the value of the uncertain payout
must exceed the value of the guaranteed payout.274
Risk aversion affects the behavior of corporate managers.  They
will choose one dollar of salary to one dollar of stock options because
the options may expire worthless.275  Even if the choice is between
one dollar of salary and stock options worth somewhat more, some
managers will still choose the salary.
Because of risk aversion, managers bargain for a higher value of
options or other performance-based compensation than risk-free
forms of compensation.276  Wishing to take advantage of the Section
162(m) performance-related tax deduction, companies award execu-
270. H.R. REP. NO. 103-111, at 648 (noting that the requirements of director indepen-
dence and shareholder approval must still be met).
271. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(ii) (1996) (providing that a bonus is objective if it can
be calculated by a third party based on specific performance results).
272. Id. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(iii) (providing that compensation subject to upward discre-
tionary adjustment does not qualify for the unlimited deductibility exception).
273. See BART DE LANGHE ET AL., THE EMOTIONAL INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEM IS
RISK AVERSE: EGO-DEPLETION AND INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR 6 (2008), http://publish-
ing.eur.nl/ir/repub/asset/13614/ERS-2008-064-MKT.pdf (noting that “most people irra-
tionally reject a gamble with equal chances to win and lose, even when the expected value
of gambling is larger than the expected value of the status quo”).
274. Cf. id. (describing the “long-standing rational, normative view on economic deci-
sion making in which consumers are described as economic actors that select alternative
options with the highest expected utility or value”).
275. See Meredith R. Conway, Money for Nothing and the Stocks for Free: Taxing Executive
Compensation, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 383, 408 (2008) (noting that corporate manag-
ers demand options worth more than they would have earned if paid a salary).
276. Id.
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tives a higher expected value of performance-based compensation
than they would have awarded them in salary.277
If the tax benefit exceeds the difference between the value of the
performance-based compensation awarded instead of salary and the
salary for which the performance-based compensation substituted, the
company has a net savings.  If, however, the tax benefit is less than
that difference, the company has incurred a net loss.  In the latter
case, the company has a disincentive to opt for performance-based
compensation.  Should the company revert to salary to minimize its
net cost, the purpose of Section 162(m)—to encourage performance-
based pay—has been frustrated.278
Even though reverting to salary-based compensation would be
the economically rational decision to avoid a loss, a company that did
so might incur the disapproval of shareholders.  They might feel that
the company had betrayed their interests not only by failing to use an
available tax benefit but also by declining to base executive pay on
performance.  To prevent shareholder discontent, a company might
elect to incur a net loss and award the risk-averse executive the op-
tions or other performance-based compensation that he or she de-
mands.  In this case, the executive receives more compensation as a
result of Section 162(m) than he or she otherwise would have re-
ceived, and the Section fails in its other essential purpose—to lower
executive compensation.279
Section 162(m) has backfired in other unexpected ways.  Many
directors view option grants as costless because such grants do not
require a company to spend cash.280  Such directors are therefore
overly generous when granting options to executives.  Another prob-
lem is that the $1 million cap has established a benchmark for CEO
salaries.281  Companies have therefore increased their CEOs’ base pay
277. See, e.g., Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 64
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 898 (2007) (providing an example of the gross up of executive
pay to offset the executive’s risk aversion).
278. See id. at 900–01 (analyzing the tax consequences of § 162(m) and providing an
example of where using the § 162(m) tax deduction would impose a net loss on the
company).
279. See id. at 901 (observing that “the public might perceive deduction forfeiture as
suggesting that boards are captured by management”).
280. See Ryan Miske, Note, Can’t Cap Corporate Greed: Unintended Consequences of Trying to
Control Executive Compensation Though the Tax Code, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1673, 1690 (2004)
(noting that many directors view options as being “costless” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
281. See id. at 1687 (reporting that the $1 million limit on the tax deductibility on non-
performance-based executive pay has established “the government-sanctioned standard”
for base salaries).
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to meet that level.  Third, unless vesting over a period of years, op-
tions and stock appreciation rights encourage executives to gamble on
risky short-term strategies to raise the value of the stock and cause the
options to spike.282  Such strategies are not likely to be in the long-
term interests of a company.  Yet, under the rules, grants of options
and stock appreciation rights are presumptively performance-
based.283  It is therefore both predictable and lamentable that public
companies have gravitated toward option grants as their principal
component of executive compensation.
The Section 162(m) standards for performance-based compensa-
tion are so permissive that they invite circumvention.  The following is
an example of a pay arrangement that meets the statutory criterion
for objective performance-based pay:
[A] bonus is based on a percentage of Corporations S’s total
profits for the fiscal year.  Although some sales are virtually
certain for virtually all public companies, it is substantially
uncertain whether a company will have profits for a specified
future period even if the company has a history of profitabil-
ity.  Therefore, the bonus will meet the [deductibility]
requirements . . . .284
This example provides a formula for the payment of undeserved
bonuses.
The shareholder-approval requirement in Section 162(m) would
seem to deter some of these abuses.  The requirement, however, is
largely ineffective.  If a plan grants options or stock appreciation
rights, the plan must merely disclose the maximum number of op-
tions or stock appreciation rights that an executive may receive.285  A
company need not disclose the precise number of such grants con-
templated for each executive.286  A company may even structure the
282. See Conway, supra note 275, at 406 (observing that option grants lead to a R
decoupling of shareholder interests from management interests).
283. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi)(A) (1996).  This provision states the following:
Compensation attributable to a stock option or a stock appreciation right is
deemed to satisfy the requirements [for deductibility] if . . . the plan under which
the option or right is granted states the maximum number of shares with respect
to which options or rights may be granted during a specified period to any
employee . . . .
Id.
284. Id. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vii), ex. 3.
285. Id. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi)(A); see also Conway, supra note 275, at 402 (noting that the R
shareholder approval requirement of § 162(m) has failed to help shareholders monitor or
control executive compensation).
286. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi)(A) (requiring disclosure of the maximum but
not the exact number of option grants an executive may receive).
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plan so that shareholder reapproval is unnecessary when the company
grants additional options or stock appreciation rights to an executive.
3. TARP Funds
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008287 was Con-
gress’s initial response to the current financial crisis.  The Act created
the Troubled Assets Relief Program to provide relief to financially be-
leaguered financial institutions.288  TARP assistance came with condi-
tions.  One condition applies to public companies receiving at least
$300,000,000 in TARP funds.289  The tax deduction for the compensa-
tion of covered employees is limited to $500,000.290  One must ques-
tion whether billion-dollar public companies will observe this limit.  In
any event, the limitation applies only to TARP recipients.291
4. Golden Parachutes and Severance Pay
Golden parachutes provide hefty payouts to executives who, be-
cause of mergers or sales of companies, are ousted from manage-
ment.292  A rationale for golden parachutes is that they ensure the
financial security of executives and therefore enable companies to re-
cruit and to retain top-level management.293  Regardless of the effi-
cacy of this rationale, the enormity of such payments aroused
congressional action.  To dissuade companies from entering into ex-
cessive golden parachute arrangements, Congress passed two tax pro-
visions in 1984.  Section 280G disallows companies from deducting
excessive golden parachute payments made to highly compensated in-
dividuals, defined as (1) the highest paid 1% of employees, or (2) the
most highly paid 250 individuals.294  Payments are deemed excessive if
they are equal to or exceed three times the average salary of the recip-
ient over the five-year period prior to the change in control.295  Sec-
tion 4999 imposes a 20% excise tax on executives who receive golden
287. Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 5201–5261).
288. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5211(a)(1) (West 2001 & Supp. 2009).
289. I.R.C. § 162(m)(5)(B)(i) (West 2002 & Supp. 2009).
290. Id. § 162(m)(5)(A)(i).
291. See id. § 162(m)(5) (setting forth “Special rule for application to employers partici-
pating in the Troubled Assets Relief Program”).
292. See id. § 280G(b)(2) (providing the statutory definition for golden parachutes).
293. See Conway, supra note 275, at 414 (observing that many executives would not ac- R
cept positions without inclusion of golden parachutes in their employment contracts).
294. I.R.C. § 280G(a), (c) (LexisNexis 2009).
295. Id. § 280G(b)(2)(A)(ii), (d)(2).
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parachute payments exceeding the limits prescribed in Section
280G.296
Like Section 162(m), these provisions have failed to achieve their
intended purpose.  Many corporations persist in awarding excessive
golden parachutes to executives.297  To counteract the effects of Sec-
tion 4999, companies agree to pay the executives a “gross up,” which is
an additional payment to offset the 20% excise tax.298  The net effect
of Sections 280G and 4999 is therefore to increase the cost of golden
parachutes to corporations.
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act has extended the
golden parachute restrictions in Section 280G to severance pay pro-
vided to covered individuals working for corporations that have re-
ceived TARP funds.299  The Act, however, will have limited impact
because it applies only to TARP recipients.
In sum, tax incentives have failed to control executive compensa-
tion.  As shown in Part VI, many reformers believe that tinkering with
the rules of corporate governance would be more effective.
VI. APPROACH FIVE: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
All the strategies previously discussed in this Article have failed to
control executive compensation.  There is a commonality to each of
these approaches that explains, at least partly, why none has even re-
motely succeeded.  Approaches that require third parties to protect
shareholder interests—whether the third parties are directors, the
SEC, the courts, or the framers of the tax code—are destined to fail.
The most effective strategy to control executive compensation is to
empower shareholders to protect themselves and the corporations
they own.300
296. I.R.C. § 4999(a)–(b) (West 2009).
297. See Conway, supra note 275, at 418–19 (noting that, despite § 280G, golden para- R
chute arrangements are still part of executive compensation packages).
298. Susan Lorde Martin, Executive Compensation: Reining in Runaway Abuses—Again, 41
U.S.F. L. REV. 147, 148 (2006).
299. I.R.C. § 280G(e)(2)(B) (West 2002 & Supp. 2009).  The restrictions apply to sever-
ance pay resulting from involuntary termination, bankruptcy, liquidation, or receivership.
Id.
300. See Lawton W. Hawkins, Compensation Representatives: A Prudent Solution to Excessive
CEO Pay, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 449, 473–75 (2007) (suggesting ways shareholders can address
excessive executive compensation).  Recognizing that many corporate boards make com-
pensation-related decisions that are not in the best interests of shareholders, Professor
Hawkins proposes that shareholders objecting to their companies’ excessive compensation
practices amend company bylaws to authorize the three largest shareholders to appoint a
“compensation representative.” Id. at 473.  The compensation representative would be en-
titled to attend compensation committee meetings and board of directors meetings where
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This Article organizes corporate governance initiatives to control
executive compensation into four broadening tiers.  The first and
least empowering is “say-on-pay.”  Appearing in some proxy state-
ments, say-on-pay resolutions merely provide shareholders with an ad-
visory vote on executive compensation.301  The American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act of 2009302 requires recipients of TARP funds to
provide shareholders with annual say-on-pay votes, and the United
Kingdom has adopted a say-on-pay law.303
The second tier of initiatives would enhance shareholder power
by allowing them to nominate directors, who presumably would be
more responsive to shareholder interests than adverse interests of
management.  This approach has gained support on several fronts.
Delaware has enacted legislation to permit shareholders to participate
in the nominating process, and the SEC has proposed new proxy rules
that would achieve the same result.304
Illustrated by Senator Schumer’s ambitious bill, the third tier in-
corporates a wide range of corporate governance provisions, includ-
ing both say-on-pay and shareholder nomination provisions.305
The fourth and most radical tier would empower the federal gov-
ernment to regulate executive pay arrangements.  Sponsored by Rep-
resentative Barney Frank, the House has passed a bill that would grant
federal regulators veto power over compensation arrangements that
encourage excessive risk-taking.306  Senator Durbin has proposed an-
other bill, which would cap executive pay at 100 times the average
salary of company employees, unless shareholders voted for higher
he or she could offer opinions and advice on compensation-related issues and objections
to board decisions. Id. at 474.  All compensation-related information presented to the
board, the compensation committee, and any compensation consultant would be available
to the compensation representative. Id. If the compensation representation reached an
impasse with the directors, the compensation representative could report his or her objec-
tions to the appointing shareholders. Id. After attempting to resolve the impasse, a share-
holder could force the company to include an alternative to the contested board proposal,
but shareholders would have only an advisory vote. Id. at 474–75.  The shareholder propo-
sal, Professor Hawkins notes, would be limited to 500 words under SEC Rule 14a-8. Id. at
477.  Professor Hawkins’s proposal, though intriguing, does not go far enough.  Advisory
votes would not shift meaningful power to shareholders, and 500-word statements would
not afford protesting shareholders the opportunity to express fully their objections to the
wide-ranging executive compensation packages proposed by directors.  Nor would such
short statements enable protesting shareholders to present and defend their
counterproposals.
301. See infra Part VI.A.
302. Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (to be codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
303. See infra notes 313, 316–18 and accompanying text. R
304. See infra Part VI.B.
305. See infra Part VI.C.
306. See infra Part VI.D.1.
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pay arrangements.307  The statutory and regulatory scheme applied to
recipients of TARP funds also includes limits on executive pay.  In
addition, this framework adopts numerous other corporate govern-
ance strategies such as mandatory say-on-pay and the enhancement of
the independence and role of compensation committees.308
A. Say-on-Pay
Because of the public clamor over excessive executive pay, a grow-
ing number of public companies have elected to include say-on-pay
resolutions in their proxy statements.309  In some cases, activist share-
holders have compelled companies such as Time Warner and Co-
nocoPhillips to include say-on-pay resolutions in their proxy
statements, despite the opposition of these companies.310  While still
in the Senate, President Obama, along with Representative Frank,
sponsored say-on-pay legislation.311
307. See infra Part VI.D.2.
308. See infra Part VI.D.3.
309. Verizon, MBIA, H&R Block, Ingersoll Rand, Blockbuster, Tech Data, and TIAA-
CREF have all agreed to include say-on-pay resolutions in their proxy statements. See Time
Warner Notice, supra note 60, at 131 (listing companies that agreed to an executive com- R
pensation advisory vote); see also INTEL NOTICE, supra note 56, at 64 (recommending that R
shareholders vote “yes” on the following question: “Do you approve of the Compensation
Committee’s compensation philosophy, policies, and procedures as described in the ‘Com-
pensation Discussion and Analysis’ section of this proxy statement?”).  This question does
not solicit shareholder opinions of actual amounts of compensation awarded to company
executives.
310. See Time Warner Notice, supra note 60, at 131–33 (outlining shareholders’ request R
that Time Warner “adopt a policy that provides shareholders the opportunity at each an-
nual shareholder meeting to vote on an advisory resolution . . . to ratify the compensation
of . . . executive officers”).  Time Warner opposed adoption of the resolution primarily on
the ground that a regulatory framework, if adopted by the SEC or the stock exchanges,
would be a better approach to provide shareholders with an advisory vote on executive
compensation. Id. at 132.  Time Warner argued that shareholders lack the information
needed to make well-considered decisions on executive pay. Id. at 133.  This objection
seems difficult to defend.  First, shareholders receive a wealth of compensation-related dis-
closures.  Ironically, ConocoPhillips, in opposing say-on-pay, raised this very point. See CO-
NOCOPHILLIPS NOTICE, supra note 155, at 80–82 (urging shareholders to vote against say-on- R
pay resolution because, among other things, other channels of corporate governance pro-
vide shareholders with adequate input into the compensation process).  Second, the pro-
posed resolution would merely give the shareholders a nonbinding vote. See Time Warner
Notice, supra note 60, at 131 (“The proposal submitted to shareholders should make clear R
that the vote is non-binding and would not affect any compensation paid or awarded to any
[named executive officer].”).
311. Introduced by former Senator Obama in the Senate on April 20, 2007, and Repre-
sentative Frank of Massachusetts in the House on March 1, 2007, the Shareholder Vote on
Executive Compensation Act would provide shareholders with say-on-pay and a nonbind-
ing vote on golden parachutes.  S. 1181, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1257, 110th Cong.
(2007).  Both bills were referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-
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Concerned with the misuse of federal bailout funds, the public
protested against enriching already affluent corporate executives.
This public antipathy applied most keenly to officers and directors
whose mismanagement had edged their companies to the brink of
financial collapse.  As President Obama declared, “We don’t disparage
wealth.  We don’t begrudge anybody for achieving success.  And we
believe success should be rewarded.  But what gets people upset—and
rightfully so—are executives being rewarded for failure, especially
when those rewards are subsidized by U.S. taxpayers.”312  Spurred by
public protest, Congress included a say-on-pay provision in the TARP
legislation.  Under the new law, recipients of TARP funds are required
to provide shareholders with a nonbinding vote to approve or disap-
prove the executive compensation arrangements disclosed in their
CD&A, compensation tables, and related materials.313
Although affording shareholders some input over executive com-
pensation, the say-on-pay approach is a half-measure, which is inade-
quate to protect the interests of shareholders and their companies.
Corporations may heed or ignore such advisory votes; their prefer-
ence is to ignore.  Disregarding shareholder sentiments expressed in
such votes may arouse public anger, but such votes may not receive
enough attention to incite the public mind.  It must be remembered
that many shareholders barely glance at tedious annual reports and
proxy statements.314  Many may not know that a say-on-pay resolution
is buried in the materials, and others, who are more informed, may
recognize the futility of casting a vote.  In addition, despite providing
voluminous disclosures, companies withhold from shareholders the
performance criteria applied to compensation decisions and the per-
fairs. See S. 1181 (noting that the bill was “referred to the Committee on Banking, Hous-
ing, and Urban Affairs”); H.R. 1257 (same).
312. Jonathan Weisman & Joann S. Lublin, Obama Lays Out Limits on Executive Pay, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 5, 2009, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
313. 12 U.S.C.S. § 5221(e)(1)–(2) (LexisNexis 2009).  Section 5221(e)(2) provides as
follows:
A shareholder vote [requiring that TARP recipients permit shareholders to vote
on executive compensation] shall not be binding on the board of directors of a
TARP recipient, and may not be construed as overruling a decision by such
board, nor to create or imply any additional fiduciary duty by such board, nor
shall such vote be construed to restrict or limit the ability of shareholders to make
proposals for inclusion in proxy materials related to executive compensation.
12 U.S.C.S. § 5221(e)(2); see also TARP Standard for Compensation and Corporate Gov-
ernance, 74 Fed. Reg. 28,394, 28,402 (June 15, 2009) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 30)
[hereinafter Interim Final Rule] (establishing a say-on-pay requirement for TARP
recipients).
314. See supra notes 153–59 and accompanying text. R
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formance results of executives.315  This lack of information impedes
shareholders’ ability to make informed decisions.  Furthermore, say-
on-pay resolutions do not afford shareholders any alternatives for ex-
ecutive compensation.  Much like a contract of adhesion, the pay ar-
rangements are presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and they are
disclosed only after the company has bestowed its generosity on
management.
Measures are tested by results.  Say-on-pay does not appear to
have slowed the rise of executive compensation in the United States.
Nor has it worked in the United Kingdom.  In 2002, the United King-
dom adopted executive compensation disclosure requirements similar
to the CD&A.316  As part of this regulatory framework, the United
Kingdom required “quoted” companies317 to provide shareholders
with a nonbinding vote on executive compensation.318  Patricia Hew-
itt, former Trade and Industry Secretary, has lauded these regulations
for achieving “improved disclosure of directors’ pay and rewards and
better engagement with shareholders.”319  Hewitt may have been right
in asserting that these regulations have enhanced corporate disclo-
sures of executive compensation.  Empirical research has shown, how-
ever, that the United Kingdom’s approach has failed to moderate the
levels and even the growth rate of the executive compensation dis-
315. See supra Part III.C.2.
316. Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations, 2002, S.I. 2002/1986 (U.K.); see also
Small Companies and Groups (Accounts and Directors’ Report) Regulations, 2008, S.I.
2008/409, sched. 3, pts. 1–12 (U.K.) (setting forth remuneration disclosure requirements
for small companies).
317. The regulations provide as follows: “A quoted company is defined . . . as a company
whose equity share capital has been included in the official list in accordance with the
provisions of Part VI of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, is officially listed in an
EEA State or is admitted to dealing on either the New York Stock Exchange or the ex-
change known as Nasdaq.”  Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations, 2002, S.I. 2002/
1986, Explanatory Note (U.K.).
318. The regulations provide for an advisory shareholder vote on executive compensa-
tion: “The company must, prior to the meeting, give to the members of the company enti-
tled to be sent notice of the meeting notice of the intention to move at the meeting, as an
ordinary resolution, a resolution approving the directors’ remuneration report for the fi-
nancial year.” Id. § 7(3).  The regulations further state that “[n]o entitlement of a person
to remuneration is made conditional on the resolution being passed by reason only of the
provision made by this section.” Id. § 7(8).  To ensure compliance, the regulations provide
that “[i]f the resolution is not put to the vote of the meeting, each existing director is guilty
of an offence and liable to a fine.” Id. § 7(10).
319. Directors’ Pay Rules Work, So No Need for Legislation-Hewitt, COMPANY LAW. 2005, 26(5),
146; see also M. Harrison, Ms. Hewitt Can Bark but Her Pay Law Won’t Bite, INDEPENDENT, Oct.
20, 2001, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/comment/ms-hewitt-
can-bark-but-her-pay-law-wont-bite-632017.html (criticizing Hewitt’s attempt to improve
disclosure of director pay).
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pensed by regulated companies.320  Some evidence indicates that the
regulations have increased corporate sensitivity to linking CEO pay to
performance,321 but substituting excessive grants of options and re-
stricted stock for excessive salaries does not fix the problem.
Though say-on-pay is a timid approach to controlling executive
compensation, some commentators have criticized say-on-pay for go-
ing too far.  They argue that say-on-pay resolutions overburden com-
panies, encroach on the province of directors, and encourage
shareholder interference with other controversial issues that may
arise.322  Others observe that shareholders lack the knowledge of com-
pensation packages to make informed decisions when voting on say-
on-pay resolutions.323  Still others question the effectiveness of say-on-
pay resolutions because a “no” vote registers disapproval without ex-
plaining what alternative arrangement would satisfy shareholders.324
These challenges to the desirability and effectiveness of say-on-pay ap-
ply equally to the proposal made in this Article to empower sharehold-
ers to decide between alternative recommendations for executive
compensation.  Accordingly, after setting forth the proposal, this Arti-
cle will discuss and attempt to refute these criticisms.  First, however,
320. See Fabrizio Ferri & David Maber, Say on Pay and CEO Compensation: Evidence
from the UK 2 (March 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (concluding
that the United Kingdom’s say-on-pay regulation has not affected the level and growth rate
of corporate executives, though it has prompted management to tie pay to performance).
But see Sandeep Gopalan, Say on Pay and the SEC Disclosure Rules: Expressive Law and CEO
Compensation, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 207, 241–42 (2008) (arguing that say-on-pay legislation may
be working).  Gopalan argues that law has an “expressive” function, which socializes pro-
social behavior and leads to the internalization of socially desirable norms. Id. at 241.  He
believes that legislation and regulations making say-on-pay mandatory may succeed in con-
trolling executive compensation if corporate management internalizes norms refuting the
idea that “greed is good.” Id. at 241–42 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Such sociali-
zation, Gopalan suggests, may be achieved if institutional shareholders shame greedy exec-
utives into changing their behavior. Id. at 246.
321. See Ferri & Maber, supra note 320. R
322. See Tresa Baldas, “Say on Pay” May Be Here to Stay, NAT’L L.J., May 19, 2008, at 4.  The
article quotes J. Mark Poerio, a practitioner in the field of executive compensation:
It’s a nuisance . . . .  Governmental regulators and the courts have long drawn a
line between the appropriate role of shareholders, which is to elect those who will
govern a company as its directors . . . .  The say-on-pay initiative . . . places us on a
slippery slope that opens the door for mandating future nonbinding votes on any
issue that becomes front-page news.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
323. See id. (referring to the comments of Paul Ritter, a law practitioner in the field of
executive compensation).
324. Id. (referring to the comments of Johanna O’Loughlin, a law practitioner in the
field, who suggested that companies should focus on linking pay to performance, which is
the primary concern of shareholders).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\69-3\MLR301.txt unknown Seq: 56 25-MAY-10 6:34
474 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 69:419
this Article will discuss other corporate governance measures that seek
to control executive compensation.
B. The Nomination of Directors
Some believe that providing shareholders with the power to nom-
inate candidates for the board of directors will help shareholders con-
trol executive pay.  The theory holds that directors nominated and
elected by shareholders will be more sensitive to shareholder interests
than directors nominated by management.325
1. SEC Proxy Regulation
The SEC’s concerns over corporate risk-taking and compensation
structures prompted it to reconsider a contentious issue—whether
SEC proxy rules should permit shareholders to nominate candidates
for the board of directors.326  This issue has long been controversial.
In October 2003, the SEC proposed Rule 14a-11, which would, “under
certain circumstances, [have] require[d] companies to include in
their proxy materials security holder nominees for election as direc-
tor.”327  Under intense opposition spearheaded by corporate lobbyists,
the proposal languished for years.328  Rededicated to providing share-
325. Most elections for directors are uncontested.  Directors, under NYSE Rule 452, may
cast votes for shares held in street name in uncontested elections in place of shareholders
who neglected to vote themselves. See NYSE, Inc., Rule 452 (2009), available at http://
rules.nyse.com/nysetools/PlatformViewer.asp?SelectedNode=chp_1_2&manual=/nyse/
rules/nyse-rules.  Since brokers tend to vote for the slate of nominated directors, brokers
wield substantial power in elections. See NYSE, INC., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE PROXY WORKING GROUP TO THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 9 (2006), http://www.
nyse.com/pdfs/proxy_working_group062006.pdf (explaining the impact of broker votes
on “just vote no” campaigns (internal quotation marks omitted)).  The NYSE has proposed
to change Rule 452 to eliminate broker discretionary voting in uncontested elections for
directors. See id. at 8–9 (explaining the problems associated with “Broker Discretionary
Voting”).  As expected, boards oppose this rule change, while shareholders support it. See
Yin Wilczek, Proxies: Fight Over Shareholder Proxies Focuses on NYSE Proposal to Drop Broker
Voting, BROKER/DEALER COMPLIANCE REP., Apr. 8, 2009 (explaining that this rule change
will help shareholders hold directors accountable).
326. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Votes to Propose Rule Amendments to Facilitate Rights
of Shareholders to Nominate Directors (May 20, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2009/2009-116.htm [hereinafter SEC Votes to Propose Rule Amendments]
(explaining that the SEC was voting on an amendment to provide certain shareholders the
right to nominate candidates for the board of directors).
327. See Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784 (Oct. 23, 2003).
The SEC explained that “the proposed rules are intended to create a mechanism for nomi-
nees of long-term security holders, or groups of long-term security holders, with significant
holdings to be included in company proxy materials where there are indications that secur-
ity holders need such access to further an effective proxy process.” Id.
328. See GARY M. BROWN, SODERQUIST ON THE SECURITIES LAWS § 10:4.4 (5th ed. 2008)
(detailing the history of proposed Rule 14a-11).
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holders with more say in corporate governance, the SEC, on May 20,
2009, announced a proposal for a new version of Rule 14a-11,329
which, like the prior proposal, would grant certain shareholders the
right to participate in the nominating process.330  Three of the five
Commissioners, including Chairman Mary Schapiro, supported the
proposal.331  Schapiro observed, “This proposal represents nearly
seven years of debate about whether the federal proxy rules should
support—or stand in the way of—shareholders exercising [this] fun-
damental right . . . .”332
New proposed Rule 14a-11 would allow shareholders of Exchange
Act reporting companies to nominate directors if the shareholders
meet ownership requirements that vary with the market value of a
company’s outstanding stock.333  A shareholder of a “large accelerated
filer,” defined as a reporting company with a market value of at least
$700 million, would have to own at least 1% of the voting stock to
participate in the nominating process.334  For “accelerated filers”—
companies with a market value of between $75 million and $700 mil-
lion—a shareholder would have to own at least 3% of the voting stock
to qualify.335  Shareholders of companies with a market value below
$75 million—called non-accelerated filers—would have to own at least
5% of the voting stock.336
Eligible shareholders would be able to nominate one director or
25% of the number of directors to be elected, whichever is greater.337
Such shareholders would not be permitted to acquire or hold the
329. See SEC Votes to Propose Rule Amendments, supra note 326 (“[T]he Commission is R
proposing rule amendments that would provide shareholders with a meaningful ability to
exercise their state law rights to nominate the directors of the companies that they own.”).
330. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024 (June 18,
2009) [hereinafter Facilitating Nominations].
331. See Yin Wilczek, Proxies: In Split Vote, SEC Agrees to Propose Shareholder Proxy Access Rule
Amendments, Sec. L. Daily (BNA), May 21, 2009 (“The Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion . . . voted 3-2 to propose changes to federal proxy rules that would facilitate the rights
of shareholders under state law to nominate corporate directors.”).  Commissioners Casey
and Paredes issued a statement that the proposals encroached on the prerogative of corpo-
rate boards and the jurisdiction of the states. Id. Commissioner Casey also criticized the
proposals for using the financial crisis as an excuse to over-regulate companies that did
nothing to contribute to the crisis.  Id.
332. SEC Votes to Propose Rule Amendments, supra note 326. R
333. See Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, SEC Votes to Issue New Proxy Access Proposals,
http://business.cch.com/securitieslaw/news/05-22-09b.asp (last visited Apr. 3, 2010)
(summarizing the proposal and the views of Commission members on the proposal).
334. Facilitating Nominations, supra note 330, at 29,035; see also SEC Votes to Propose R
Rule Amendments, supra note 326 (discussing the provisions of proposed Rule 14a-11). R
335. Facilitating Nominations, supra note 330, at 29,035. R
336. Id.
337. Id. at 29,043.
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stock to effect a change in corporate control or to gain more than
minority representation on the board.338  They would have to sign a
statement declaring their intention to hold their stock until the next
annual shareholders’ meeting.339  Nominating shareholders would be
liable for their misleading statements in the proxy materials.340
In conjunction with Rule 14a-11, the SEC has also proposed to
amend Rule 14a-8(i)(8).341  Rule 14a-8 requires companies to include
certain shareholder proposals in proxy statements, but Rule 14a-
8(i)(8) provides that a corporation may exclude a shareholder propo-
sal that “relates to a nomination or an election for membership on the
company’s board of directors.”342  The SEC had long construed the
phrase “relates to . . . an election” to exclude shareholder proposals to
change corporate bylaws that would permit shareholders to nominate
candidates for the board of directors.343  In American Federation of State,
County & Municipal Employees v. American International Group, Inc.,344
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the
SEC’s interpretation of the “election exclusion” in Rule 14a-8(i)(8)
and held that the phrase “relates to . . . an election” applied only to
shareholder proposals affecting a single election, rather than all elec-
tions.345  Thus, the court effectively eliminated the election exclusion.
Not to be bullied by the Second Circuit, the SEC nullified the court’s
holding by codifying its interpretation of the exclusion.346  Under the
Obama administration, however, the SEC has reversed course and it
now supports shareholder participation in the nominating process.347
2. Delaware Corporate Law
Delaware recently amended its corporate code to allow bylaws to
require the inclusion of shareholder nominees for the board of direc-
338. Id. at 29,037.
339. Id. at 29,045.
340. Id. at 29,061.
341. See SEC Votes to Propose Rule Amendments, supra note 326 (discussing the pro- R
posed amendment to Rule 14a-8(i)(8)).
342. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8) (2009).
343. See id. (articulating this exclusion); see also Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun.
Employees v. Am. Int’l Group, Inc., 462 F.3d 121, 126 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting the SEC’s
interpretation of the phrase “relates to . . . an election”).
344. 462 F.3d 121.
345. Id. at 126, 129–30 (rejecting the SEC’s position because the SEC had originally
interpreted the exclusion to apply only to single elections, and the court deferred to the
SEC’s initial interpretation of the rule, rather than a subsequent interpretation).
346. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8).
347. See Facilitating Nominations, supra note 330, at 29,071. R
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tors on proxy materials.348  The bylaws may provide for the reimburse-
ment of shareholder expenses incurred in soliciting proxies.349
Until the SEC amends Rule 14a-8(i)(8) to allow shareholders to
nominate candidates for boards of directors, the Delaware Code will
conflict with the SEC’s proxy rule.  In the meantime, shareholders
wishing to nominate candidates for the board of directors will proba-
bly have to prepare their own proxy materials.350
3. Critique of Changing the Nominating Process
The SEC’s proposals and the new Delaware law both seek to in-
crease shareholder power over the process of electing directors.  The-
oretically, shareholders would nominate and elect directors who
would serve their interests rather than executive greed.  Shareholder
power over the nominating process is, however, a circuitous solution.
It is a proposal to make three left turns to get to a destination, when
one right turn would get you to the same place.  That single right turn
would give the owners of the corporation—the shareholders—the
power to vote directly on executive compensation agreements.  It
should be noted, in addition, that having the power to nominate a
director does not ensure that the nominee will be elected.  Finally,
proposals to increase shareholder power in the nominating process
do not insulate shareholder-nominated directors from many of the
corrupting influences detailed by Bebchuk and Fried such as the
temptation to bargain with the CEO for favorable pay arrangements,
348. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112 (2009).  The Section provides as follows:
The bylaws may provide that if the corporation solicits proxies with respect to an
election of directors, it may be required, to the extent and subject to such proce-
dures or conditions as may be provided in the bylaws, to include in its proxy
solicitation materials (including any form of proxy it distributes), in addition to
individuals nominated by the board of directors, one or more individuals nomi-
nated by a stockholder.
Id.  The Section goes on to specify numerous conditions that a company might institute on
a shareholder’s nomination rights. Id.
349. Id. § 113(a) (“The bylaws may provide for the reimbursement by the corporation of
expenses incurred by a stockholder in soliciting proxies in connection with an election of
directors, subject to such procedures or conditions as the bylaws may prescribe . . . .”); see
also CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 235–37 (Del. 2008) (upholding the
validity of a proposed bylaw providing for the reimbursement of shareholder expenses
incurred in the process of nominating candidates for the board of directors because such a
bylaw is procedural, rather than substantive, and it therefore does not encroach on the
board’s prerogatives).
350. See Shari Qualters, Changes in Delaware Corporate Law Expected to Aid Activists Change
Bylaws, Elect Directors, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 23, 2009 (noting that, until the SEC rule is amended,
shareholders in Delaware corporations may have to disseminate their own proxy
materials).
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the desire to function as an amiable team player, and the impulse to
cower to the demands of the omnipotent CEO.351
C. Senator Schumer’s Comprehensive Bill
Senator Schumer has introduced a bill, entitled the Shareholder
Bill of Rights Act of 2009, which would increase shareholder power
over corporate governance.352  In touting his bill, Senator Schumer
highlighted its goals:
By requiring both boards and managers to be more respon-
sive to the concerns of their shareholders, I am confident we
will create more accountability, more transparency, and ulti-
mately more long-term stability and profitability within the
corporations that are so vital to the health, well-being, and
prosperity of the American people and our economy.353
The bill would mandate say-on-pay resolutions on all annual
proxy solicitations made under SEC regulations.354  Golden
parachutes would also be put to a nonbinding vote of the
shareholders.355
351. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 35, at 31–33. R
352. S. 1074, 111th Cong. (2009).  This bill was referred to the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs. Id.; see also Press Release, Congressman Gary Peters, Con-
gressman Peters Introduces Bill to Empower Shareholders (June 12, 2009) (providing a
summary of a related bill, the Shareholder Empowerment Act of 2009).  Congressman
Peters said, “As an investment advisor for over 20 years, shareholder rights issues have
always been very important to me.  This bill empowers shareholders, a company’s true
owners.” Id. The bill contains many provisions similar to the provisions in Senator Schu-
mer’s proposal.  Entitled the Shareholder Empowerment Act of 2009, this bill would (1)
require directors to receive a majority vote in uncontested elections, (2) permit sharehold-
ers holding at least 1% of outstanding shares for at least one year to nominate candidates
for director on corporate proxy materials, (3) eliminate voting by uninstructed brokers
holding shareholder stock in street name, (4) prohibit compensation consultants from
performing other services for corporations that have engaged them, (5) provide share-
holders with say-on-pay, (6) prohibit the same person from serving as CEO and director,
(7) strengthen clawbacks of pay awarded on the basis of fraud or faulty earnings state-
ments, (8) prohibit golden parachutes for executives fired for poor performance, and (9)
require compensation performance targets to be disclosed to shareholders. Id.
353. Yin Wilczek, Proxies: Two Bills, One Soon to Be Introduced, Give Shareholders Say on Pay,
Nominations, Sec. L. Daily (BNA), May 15, 2009 (quoting Schumer, who criticized many
corporate boards of directors for neglecting the long-term interests of their companies and
the shareholders). But see Lipton, supra note 159 (arguing that the influence of institu- R
tional investors such as hedge funds, which control more than 75% of the shares of major
companies, has contributed to the short-term excessive risk-taking responsible for the fail-
ures of corporate governance and the onset of the current financial crisis).
354. S. 1074 § 14A(a)–(b).
355. Id. § 14A(c) (providing that golden parachute payments triggered by acquisition,
merger, or other proposed sale of substantially all the assets of the issuer be subject to an
advisory vote of the shareholders).
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Perhaps recognizing that advisory votes provide a weak deterrent
to executive pay abuse, Senator Schumer’s bill would provide more
substantive corporate governance solutions.356  Similar to the SEC’s
proposals and Delaware law, the bill would empower shareholders
owning not less than 1% of the issuer’s voting stock for at least two
years to nominate individuals to the board of directors.357  Another
Section of Senator Schumer’s bill would require the chairperson of
the board of directors to be independent and would not permit any-
one to sit as chairperson who had previously served as an executive
officer of the issuer.358  The bill would also require that, to be elected,
a nominee for director in an uncontested election must receive a ma-
jority of votes cast.359  Finally, the bill would require the issuer to es-
tablish a risk committee, comprised of independent directors, to
assess the risk-management practices of the issuer.360
Aside from say-on-pay and shareholder rights to participate in the
nominating process, which this Article has already discussed, the pro-
visions in Senator Schumer’s bill afford only minimal protections to
shareholders who wish to constrain executive compensation.  Requir-
ing that the chairperson of the board be independent would not di-
minish the influence of a powerful CEO and other top managers.361
Disallowing former executive officers from sitting as a board’s
chairperson might reduce the influence of managerial power margin-
ally, but it would not eliminate it.  The requirement that nominees
garner a majority, rather than a plurality, of votes would strengthen
the position of shareholders who refuse to vote for company nomi-
nees for the board, but it would not provide them with any control
over compensation packages.
The purpose of risk committees would be to curb the rampant
speculation that foreshadowed the current financial crisis.  By moni-
toring business strategies, risk committees might dissuade compensa-
tion committees from granting executives large blocks of short-term
options, which reward imprudent risk-taking.  This solution may
356. See J. Robert Brown, Wachtell, Lipton and the Opening Salvo Against the Shareholder Bill
of Rights (The Criticisms), RACE TO THE BOTTOM, May 15, 2009, http://www.theracetothebot-
tom.org/shareholder-rights/wachtell-lipton-and-the-opening-salvo-against-the-shareholde.
html (arguing that most of the reforms proposed by Senator Schumer are already under-
way and that the bill, if passed, would merely accelerate the process).
357. S. 1074 § 4(d).
358. Id. § 5(e)(2).
359. Id. § 5(e)(4)(A).
360. Id. § 5(e)(5)(A).  The SEC would be empowered to issue rules regarding the estab-
lishment of risk committees. Id. § 5(e)(5)(B).
361. See supra Part II.A–B.
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sound promising, but it is not.  Risk committees would likely fare no
better than compensation committees.  A corporation may churn out
countless committees and the results will be more corporate clutter
and cost without increased efficiency.
D. Government Control
Both Representative Frank and Senator Durbin have proposed
separate pieces of legislation that would grant the federal government
authority to control executive compensation.  In addition, the statu-
tory and regulatory framework applied to TARP recipients includes,
among its numerous corporate governance provisions, pay caps. Both
legislative proposals as well as the TARP framework will be discussed
below.
1. Regulatory Veto
On July 21, 2009, Representative Barney Frank introduced the
Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act of
2009.362  The bill was reported by committee only one week later, and
on July 31, the House approved the bill by a vote of 237–185.363
The bill would require Exchange Act reporting companies to pro-
vide shareholders with advisory say-on-pay votes and nonbinding votes
on golden parachutes triggered by mergers, acquisitions, or consolida-
tions.364  The bill would also require compensation committee mem-
bers to be “independent,” defined as accepting no compensation
from the company other than pay for serving as a director or commit-
tee member.365  Compensation consultants, hired by reporting com-
panies, would also have to meet standards of independence
prescribed by the SEC.366
The most innovative but dubious provision of the bill would es-
tablish regulatory control over executive compensation arrangements.
Recognizing that banks, broker-dealers, and other financial institu-
tions engaged in speculative transactions that jeopardized the sound-
ness of the economy, the bill would require such institutions to
disclose to federal regulators, including the SEC, Federal Reserve, and
FDIC, the structures of all incentive-based compensation arrange-
362. H.R. 3269, 111th Cong. (2009).
363. Michael Cohn, House Says Yea on “Say on Pay,” WEBCPA, Aug. 3, 2009, http://www.
webcpa.com/debits_credits/House-Says-Yea-on-Say-on-Pay-51214-1.html.
364. H.R. 3269 § 2(i)(1)–(2).
365. Id. § 10B(b).
366. Id. § 10B(c).
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ments.367  These disclosures would enable the regulators to determine
if such arrangements were aligned with sound risk management or
could have serious adverse effects on economic conditions.  The bill
would direct these federal regulators jointly to prescribe regulations
that prohibit compensation arrangements encouraging dangerously
excessive risk-taking.368
Although certain compensation arrangements of executives of fi-
nancial institutions spawned reckless risk-taking and catastrophic fi-
nancial loss, one must question whether federal regulators should
have veto power over pay arrangements.  Although regulators may set
guidelines for corporate governance, they should not entwine them-
selves in corporate decisionmaking.  Governmental bureaucrats are
not equipped to decide executive pay.  Just as federal regulators have
no business telling a dressmaker what fabric to use in the production
process, they have no business telling a dressmaker how much to pay
its CEO.  Fully informed shareholders must have the power to set the
pay of executives who run their corporations.
2. Federal Pay Cap
Senator Durbin has proposed a bill, entitled the Excessive Pay
Shareholder Approval Act, which would limit the annual compensa-
tion of any executive of a publicly traded company to 100 times the
average compensation of all employees of the issuer unless at least
60% of shareholders vote to approve a higher compensation
arrangement.369
This provision would curb levels of executive compensation, but a
federally imposed limit, even if subject to a shareholder override, does
not provide a desirable resolution to the executive-compensation
problem.  First, the multiple proposed by Senator Durbin sets a floor
for executive compensation.  Companies that have paid their CEOs
less than the 100 multiple would be drawn irresistibly to raise execu-
tive pay until it reached that level.  Second, Senator Durbin’s bill in-
vites manipulation.  Boards of directors will urge shareholders to
367. Id. § 4(a)(1).  The bill exempts institutions with under $1 billion in assets. Id.
§ 4(e).
368. Id. § 4(b).  Clawbacks may not operate retroactively unless the challenged compen-
sation structure has been in place for more than two years. Id. § 4(f).
369. S. 1006, 111th Cong. (2009) (as proposed May 7, 2009).  This bill has been referred
to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. See id.; see also Roger Lowen-
stein, Thain’s Original Sin Rooted in Executive Pay, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 26, 2009, http://www.
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&sid=axxhbeptMUgE (proposing that Congress
pass a law requiring that any executive compensation exceeding a fixed ceiling, $5 million,
for example, must be approved in a vote by the shareholders).
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approve excessive pay arrangements for their executives in one-sided
proxy disclosures that omit counterarguments.  Companies are well-
schooled in such manipulation, having tailored their SEC disclosures
for decades.  Third and most critically, this proposal, like Representa-
tive Frank’s bill, concentrates too much power to control executive
compensation in the federal government.  Although shareholders
might recoil at executive paychecks that exceed 100 times the average
worker’s wage, Congress should not establish dollar limits on pay.
Granting shareholders power to override the cap, however, is a desira-
ble feature of the bill.  Shareholders should decide executive pay.
3. TARP Restrictions
In addition to the tax deductibility limitations and say-on-pay pro-
vision already discussed, the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act of 2009 establishes rules for corporate governance for recipients
of TARP funds, and it imposes limits on executive compensation.370
Under a grant of authority from the American Recovery and Reinvest-
ment Act, the Treasury Department,371 on June 15, 2009, issued an
Interim Final Rule on TARP Standards for Compensation and Corpo-
rate Governance.372  The Rule seeks to align the pay of executives of
TARP recipients with the interests of their shareholders and to help
ensure the stability of the economy.373  This framework applies to all
370. See generally Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 7001, 123 Stat. 115, 516–20 (amending 12 U.S.C.
§ 5221 (2006)).  The compensation restrictions in the Act cease to apply at such time as
the federal government holds only warrants to purchase an institution’s common stock. Id.
371. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act authorizes the Treasury Secretary to
“promulgate regulations to implement this section.” Id.
372. Interim Final Rule, supra note 313.  In February 2009, the U.S. Treasury an- R
nounced additional compensation guidelines. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Trea-
sury, Treasury Announces New Restrictions on Executive Compensation (Feb. 4, 2009),
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg15.htm (announcing that the new
guidelines seek to ensure that TARP funds are not used for “inappropriate private gain”);
see also Joseph E. Bachelder III, Executive Compensation: ARRA Amends EESA: Includes New Pay
Limits at Affected Institutions, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 14, 2009 (summarizing provisions of the federal
statutory rules and TG-15 and comparing the original provisions of the Emergency Eco-
nomic Stabilization Act enacted on October 3, 2008, to the statutory amendments in the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act enacted on February 17, 2009).  In addition to
the Interim Final Rule, the Department of the Treasury has proposed legislation to control
executive compensation of all reporting companies.  Investor Protection Act of 2009, H.R.
3817, 111th Cong. (2009).  This proposal would require all reporting companies to pro-
vide shareholders with say-on-pay votes, id. § 941(a), to provide shareholders with nonbind-
ing votes to approve golden parachutes, id., to enhance the independence of
compensation committees, id. § 942, and to provide compensation committees with the
authority and funding to engage their own compensation consultants and counsel, id.
373. See Interim Final Rule, supra note 313, at 28,396–97 (describing the statutory provi- R
sions that the Interim Final Rule implements).
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TARP recipients unless the federal government holds only warrants to
buy common stock.374  The Principal Executive Officer (“PEO”) and
Principal Financial Officer (“PFO”) of institutions receiving TARP
funds must certify annually compliance with the statutory and regula-
tory rules.375
Boards of directors of TARP recipients must establish compensa-
tion committees comprised of independent directors.376  Every six
months, compensation committees must review, with senior risk of-
ficers, both senior executive officer377 compensation plans and em-
ployee compensation plans.378  Such committees must limit features
of all compensation plans that might lead to excessive risk-taking and
they must eliminate features that might lead to the manipulation of
earnings reports.379  Reporting companies must certify in their annual
proxy statements that their compensation committees met these goals
and how the committees did so; non-reporting companies must pro-
vide the same disclosures and certification to appropriate
regulators.380
Both the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and Interim
Final Rule impose limits on the types and amounts of compensation
paid to executives of TARP recipients.  The Act prohibits the payment
or accrual of “any bonus, retention award, or incentive compensation”
to certain executives while the company remains the recipient of
TARP assistance.381  The Interim Final Rule elaborates on this restric-
tion.  For companies receiving less than $25 million in TARP assis-
tance, the prohibition applies only to the most highly paid
employee.382  For companies receiving between $25 million and $250
million, the prohibition applies to the five most highly paid employ-
374. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act § 7001; Interim Final Rule, supra note
313, at 28,397. R
375. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act § 7001; Interim Final Rule, supra note
313, at 28,402–03. R
376. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act § 7001; Interim Final Rule, supra note
313, at 28,398. R
377. The rule defines “Senior Executive Officer” as the PEO, PFO, and the three next
most highly paid executive officers.  Interim Final Rule, supra note 313, at 28,395. R
378. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act § 7001; Interim Final Rule, supra note
313, at 28,397.  If the common or preferred stock of a recipient of no more than $25 R
million of TARP funds is not registered with the SEC under the Exchange Act, the recipi-
ent’s board of directors is empowered to act in place of a Compensation Committee.
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act § 7001.
379. Interim Final Rule, supra note 313, at 28,399. R
380. Id.
381. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act § 7001.
382. Id.; Interim Final Rule, supra note 313, at 28,399. R
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ees.383  For companies receiving between $250 million and $500 mil-
lion, the prohibition applies to Senior Executive Officers (“SEOs”)384
and at least the next ten most highly compensated employees.385  For
companies receiving $500 million or more, the prohibition applies to
SEOs and at least the next twenty most highly compensated employ-
ees.386  This prohibition, however, does not apply to long-term re-
stricted stock or restricted stock units that do not fully vest while the
company is a recipient of TARP funds387 and that are not greater than
one-third the employee’s annual compensation.388  TARP recipients
must ensure that, for SEOs and the next twenty most highly compen-
sated employees, any bonus, retention award, or incentive compensa-
tion based on materially inaccurate financial statements or
performance metrics is subject to clawback.389
The Interim Final Rule authorizes the Department of the Trea-
sury to appoint a Special Master for TARP Executive Compensa-
tion.390  Dubbed the “pay czar,” Kenneth Feinberg is the current
appointee.391  The Special Master is empowered to interpret the provi-
sions of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act and Treasury rules
that regulate corporate governance and executive compensation.392
He is authorized to review compensation awarded before February 17,
2009, to employees of TARP recipients and to negotiate for the reim-
bursement of excessive compensation.393  The Interim Final Rule
383. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act § 7001; Interim Final Rule, supra note
313, at 28,399. R
384. The statute defines “senior executive officer” as “an individual who is 1 of the top 5
most highly paid executives of a public company, whose compensation is required to be
disclosed pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and any regulations issued
thereunder, and non-public company counterparts.”  American Recovery and Reinvest-
ment Act § 7001(a)(1).  The Interim Final Rule defines an SEO as the PEO, the PFO, and
the next three most highly compensated employees.  Interim Final Rule, supra note 313, at R
28,395.
385. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act § 7001; Interim Final Rule, supra note
313, at 28,399. R
386. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act § 7001; Interim Final Rule, supra note
313, at 28,399. R
387. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act § 7001; Interim Final Rule, supra note
313, at 28,401. R
388. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act § 7001; Interim Final Rule, supra note
313, at 28,400.  Contractual grants of such awards that became legally binding on or before R
February 11, 2009, are not subject to the prohibition. Id. at 28,401.
389. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act § 7001; Interim Final Rule, supra note
313, at 28,399. R
390. Interim Final Rule, supra note 313, at 28,403. R
391. Stephen Labaton, Treasury to Set Executives’ Pay at 7 Ailing Firms, N.Y. TIMES, June 10,
2009, at A1.
392. Interim Final Rule, supra note 313, at 28,404. R
393. Id.
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grants the Special Master broad powers over the recipients of “excep-
tional financial assistance.”394  These recipients of multiple grants of
financial assistance from the federal government include AIG, Ci-
tigroup, Bank of America, General Motors, GMAC, Chrysler, and
Chrysler Financial.395  The Special Master has authority over these
companies to disapprove compensation payments and structures for
SEOs and other employees who are subject to the bonus, retention
award, and incentive compensation limitations discussed above and to
disapprove compensation structures for all other executives of these
companies and their next 100 most highly compensated employees.396
The Interim Final Rule contains numerous other compensation-
related provisions.  It reaffirms that TARP recipients must provide
shareholders with say-on-pay votes.397  Recipients of TARP funds may
not award golden parachute payments, broadly defined to include sev-
erance pay,398 to SEOs or any of the next five most highly compen-
sated employees.399  The Interim Final Rule prohibits gross ups to
SEOs and the next twenty most highly compensated employees.400
TARP recipients must adopt “excessive or luxury expenditures” poli-
cies, file them with the Department of the Treasury, and, if they have
websites, they must post their policies.401  Similarly, they must disclose
and justify all perquisites over $25,000 paid to any employee subject to
the bonus restrictions discussed above.402  Finally, TARP recipients
must disclose whether they have engaged a compensation consultant,
and, if so, they must disclose all services that the consultant has pro-
vided to the company over the past three years.403
394. Id.
395. Mike Ferullo & Yin Wilczek, Administration Announces Rules, Pay Czar for TARP Firms;
Proposal for All Companies, BNA TAX & ACCOUNTING, June 12, 2009, http://www.bnatax.
com/insightdetail.aspx?id=2147483667.
396. Interim Final Rule, supra note 313, at 28,402, 28,404. R
397. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 7001, 123
Stat. 115, 516–20 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 5221 (2006)); Interim Final Rule, supra note 313, R
at 28,402.
398. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act broadly defines a “golden parachute
payment” to mean “any payment to a senior executive officer for departure from a com-
pany for any reason, except for payments for services performed or benefits accrued.”
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act § 7001.  Thus, the term “golden parachute” in-
cludes not only payments triggered by mergers or acquisitions but also severance pay.
399. Id.; Interim Final Rule, supra note 313, at 28,399. R
400. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act § 7001; Interim Final Rule, supra note
313, at 28,399. R
401. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act § 7001; Interim Final Rule, supra note
313, at 28,401–02. R
402. Interim Final Rule, supra note 313, at 28,402. R
403. Id.
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These federally imposed rules on executive compensation apply
only to recipients of TARP funds.404  As the holder of preferred stock
in these financial institutions, the federal government, having spent
billions of taxpayer money to acquire the stock, has a substantial inter-
est to establish limits on how recipients spend those funds.405  It
should not ordinarily be the government’s role, however, to entangle
itself in the affairs of corporate governance.  The government has no
defensible role in prescribing dollar limits for executive compensation
for non-recipient companies.  Its only role should be to enable share-
holders to participate in the process of setting executive
compensation.
VII. A PROPOSAL TO GIVE SHAREHOLDERS CONTROL OVER EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION
The list of strategies intended to control executive compensation
is long.  It includes the oversight of fiduciaries, disclosure regulations,
litigation, the tax law, shareholder say-on-pay, shareholder participa-
tion in the nomination of directors, and adjustments to the mecha-
nisms of internal corporate governance.  Legislators and regulators
are groping among these alternatives and proposing countless mea-
sures.  All these strategies have failed and will continue to fail because
they do not confront the problem directly.  Additionally, federally im-
posed limits on executive pay, though effective, are undesirable.  Per-
haps by necessity, Congress has become enmeshed in operating the
financial and automotive sectors of the economy.406  The goal should
404. Other pending bills would also regulate TARP funds.  The Economic Recovery Ad-
justment Act of 2009 was introduced by Senator Whitehouse on February 12, 2009.  S. 431,
111th Cong. (2009).  Referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
this bill would establish the position of Taxpayer Advocate within the Department of Jus-
tice to monitor the executive compensation of TARP fund recipients and to reach compen-
sation reduction agreements when appropriate. Id. § 4. It would also create a Temporary
Economic Recovery Oversight Panel to review agreements reached by the Taxpayer Advo-
cate and recipients of TARP funds. Id. § 7.  On February 3, 2009, Representative Bilirakis
introduced an amendment to the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act requiring the
Secretary of the Treasury to establish a database on which most institutions receiving TARP
funds would have to disclose the total compensation of their 100 most highly paid employ-
ees.  H.R. 807, 111th Cong. (2009).
405. See Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress: Before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Hous., and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Chairman Ben S. Bernanke)
(discussing the Capital Assistance Program and the Capital Purchase Program through
which the federal government purchases preferred stock in distressed banking institutions
seeking financial assistance).
406. See Gerald F. Seib, Obama Aspires to a ‘Light Touch,’ Not a Heavy Hand, WALL ST. J.,
June 17, 2009, at A2 (noting that the federal government is “a majority shareholder of
General Motors” and that President Obama is expected to propose “new oversight of big
financial institutions” and “new capital requirements for banks”); David Wessel, Obama Dis-
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be to end government control over the economy as soon as practica-
ble, not to expand it.  The government serves an imperative regula-
tory role, but it cannot replace entrepreneurship.  The inefficiencies
that the national government invariably brings to whatever enterprises
it manages warn against government intervention in the private
sector.
A. The Shareholder Compensation Committee
Shareholders must have a binding vote to determine what com-
pensation packages their companies will offer to executives.  A system
must establish a workable set of procedures to solicit the input of
shareholders, while ensuring that the exercise of shareholder power
does not disrupt corporate governance.
Amendments to Section 14 of the Exchange Act407 and Rule 14a-
8408 should provide that the bylaws of reporting companies may, upon
approval of a majority vote of the shareholders, require the creation
of a “Shareholder Compensation Committee.”  To propose such a by-
law, a shareholder would need a minimum stake in the company.  For
example, for a period of at least one year, the shareholder might be
required to have owned at least 1% of the company’s outstanding
stock or to have spent a minimum of $25,000 to purchase the stock.
The company would have to include the proposal in its annual proxy
statement.  Both the proposal and the company’s inevitable opposi-
tion might be limited to 2000 words.
The purpose of the Committee would be to analyze and, if appro-
priate, make counterproposals to the directors’ recommendations for
compensating the CEO, the CFO, the next three most highly paid ex-
ecutives, and the chairperson of the board of directors.  These six peo-
ple would be defined as “Covered Individuals.”  The bylaws could
designate any reasonable number of members to sit on the Commit-
tee.  The company would assume the costs of the election for Commit-
plays a Taste for Big Risk, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2009, at A2 (reporting on President Obama’s
initial economic agenda, which includes the acquisition of massive equity holdings in the
financial and the automotive industries).
407. Sections 14(a)–(c) regulate proxy solicitations and delegate the authority to pro-
mulgate appropriate rules and regulations to the SEC. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a), (c) (2006).
408. Rule 14a-8(i) contains exclusions to the right of shareholders to make proposals in
company proxy statements. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2009).  Two are relevant.  The first
allows a company to exclude a shareholder proposal “[i]f the proposal is not a proper
subject for action by shareholders under the laws of the jurisdiction of the company’s or-
ganization.” Id. § 240.14a-8(i)(1).  The other allows a company to exclude a shareholder
proposal “[i]f the proposal deals with a matter relating to the company’s ordinary business
operations.” Id. § 240.14a-8(i)(7).  The SEC should amend Rule 14a-8 so that neither of
these exclusions prevents the establishment of Shareholder Compensation Committees.
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tee members.  To shelter small companies from the costs of
compliance, a threshold requirement might exempt companies with a
public equity float409 of less than $75 million.410
Current or former company directors and executives and others
with close social or economic ties to them would be excluded from
participating on the Committee.  The Committee ultimately elected
would therefore be separated from the influences of managerial
power.  To run for membership on the Committee, a shareholder
would have to satisfy the same minimum ownership requirements as
required to propose the change to the bylaws.  This requirement
would disallow shareholders with insignificant or short-term stakes in
the company from running.  Six months before the annual sharehold-
ers’ meeting, the company would provide shareholders with a “Notice
of Election” informing them of their right to run for the Shareholder
Compensation Committee.  Shareholders would be informed in the
Notice of Election that election results will be made available on a
recorded telephone message and on a designated Internet website.
Those shareholders wishing to run for the Committee would have
to certify that they intend to hold their entire equity interest in the
company until the annual shareholders’ meeting.  The Notice of Elec-
tion materials would inform candidates that, as fiduciaries, Committee
members would be bound by the duty to act for the best interests of
the company and to refrain from disclosing to anyone any informa-
tion, confidential or otherwise, provided to them as Committee mem-
bers.  Candidates would have to acknowledge in writing that a breach
of these duties could result in civil liability and criminal prosecution
in the event of intentional sabotage.  These certifications would help
ensure the diligence and good faith of Committee members.
Candidates would provide a brief statement of perhaps up to 500
words, supporting their qualifications to serve on the Committee.  To
prevent the influence of managerial power from intruding into the
election process, the statute would disqualify current and former of-
ficers and directors and their close family relatives from voting.  All
409. The term “public equity float” means stock held by non-affiliates of the company.
See BROWN, supra note 328, § 4:3.1, at 4-14–4-15.  An affiliate is “a person that directly, or R
indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controls or is controlled by, or is under
common control with, the person specified.”  17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2009).
410. The $75 million figure comports with the SEC’s definition of a “smaller reporting
company,” which is subject to simplified reporting requirements. See Smaller Reporting
Company Regulatory Relief and Simplification, 73 Fed. Reg. 934, 935–36 (Jan. 4, 2008) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 228, 229, 230, 239, 240, 249, 260, 269) (defining “smaller
reporting companies” as having a public equity float of less than $75 million, or if such
calculation is impracticable, annual revenues of less than $50 million in the last fiscal year).
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other shareholders, defined as “Qualified Shareholders,” would be eli-
gible to vote.
Committee members would receive all information provided to
the director compensation committee.  The overbroad “competitive
harm” exception, which directors often use to avoid disclosing specific
executive-compensation performance goals, would be replaced with a
more restrictive standard that would permit the directors to withhold
from the Committee only trade secrets as traditionally defined by state
law.  For information to qualify as a trade secret (1) the information
would have to be of significant value to the company; (2) the informa-
tion would have to be undisclosed and unknown to the public; and
(3) the company would have to have taken reasonable steps to main-
tain the secrecy of the information.411  Performance standards, by def-
inition, would not be trade secrets.  The directors would therefore
have to reveal qualitative and quantitative performance compensation
standards applied to each of the Covered Individuals.412  The Com-
mittee would have the authority to hire an independent compensa-
tion consultant to advise it.  The company would pay the
compensation consultant’s fee.
The director compensation committee would develop proposed
annual compensation packages for the company’s Covered Individu-
als.413  While devising the compensation packages, the board of direc-
411. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 537–38 (2005).
This Section defines a trade secret as follows:
“Trade secret” means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation,
program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not
being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain
economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
Id.
412. See Donahue, supra note 154, at 77–78 (arguing that the current “competitive R
harm” standard should be tightened because companies often use the standard to conceal
quantitative and qualitative performance standards, confounding efforts to analyze the
linkage between pay and performance).
413. The directors would have to furnish the Shareholder Compensation Committee
with simple but clear summaries of pay arrangements with other directors.  Since detailed
explanations and justifications for the pay of directors other than the chairperson would
not be required, the scope of disclosures would diminish compared to disclosures in the
CD&A.  It would be unnecessary for the Shareholder Compensation Committee to propose
alternatives for all directors because, if the chairperson of the board’s compensation were
subjected to the scrutiny of the Shareholder Compensation Committee, the company
would probably not pay ordinary directors more than the chairperson unless a company
had substantial justification.  In any event, if the board voted to pay its members unreason-
ably high compensation, the Shareholder Compensation Committee, though not making
alternative proposals, would so inform shareholders.
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tors would also be working on plain English compensation-related
narrative disclosures and tables it intended to include in the proxy
materials.  At least ninety days prior to the annual shareholders’ meet-
ing, the board of directors would furnish the Shareholder Compensa-
tion Committee with (1) its proposals (presumably adopted from
those of the director compensation committee), (2) its intended
proxy disclosures, and (3) all non-trade-secret materials that it consid-
ered in reaching its recommendations.  If the board changed its in-
tended proxy disclosures, it would have to notify the Shareholder
Compensation Committee of such changes immediately.
The Shareholder Compensation Committee would review the
recommendations of the board.  To the extent that it approved the
board’s recommendations, it would inform the shareholders of the
approval in the proxy materials.  To the extent that it disapproved of
the board’s recommendations, it would provide its counterproposals
with a statement explaining why it believed its counterproposals are
superior to the proposals of the directors.  It would provide its re-
sponses to the company no later than sixty days before the annual
meeting.  This timetable would enable the board of directors to com-
ply with the requirement that shareholders receive notice of the avail-
ability of proxy materials on the Internet at least forty days before the
annual shareholders’ meeting.414  The members of the Shareholder
Compensation Committee would be subject to civil liability and crimi-
nal prosecution for any intentional material misrepresentation they
made in the proxy materials.
The proxy materials would contain a prominent disclosure in-
forming shareholders that they have a determinative vote on executive
compensation.  Only Qualified Shareholders could vote on the execu-
tive compensation proposals of the two committees.
B. Possible Criticisms and Responses
Most of the arguments opposing other corporate governance so-
lutions might be raised against the proposal in this Article.415  Each of
these objections and others will be stated and answered.
414. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-16(a)(1) (2009) (requiring that companies provide share-
holders with notice of Internet availability of proxy materials forty days prior to the annual
shareholders’ meeting).
415. See supra notes 322–24 and accompanying text. R
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1. Institutional Resistance
a. Objection
Short-term institutional investors, such as hedge funds, own huge
blocks of stock in publicly traded corporations.  Because their inter-
ests are short term, they support compensation arrangements such as
fully vested option grants, which encourage reckless risk-taking.  They
would therefore oppose bylaw proposals to establish Shareholder
Compensation Committees because such Committees would tend to
recommend compensation arrangements that would remove incen-
tives for executives to engage in excessively high-risk strategies.  If
short-term institutional investors failed to prevent the adoption of by-
laws providing for the establishment of Shareholder Compensation
Committees, they would vote for proposals that would provide man-
agement with incentives for high risk-taking.
b. Response
Longer-term institutional investors, such as mutual funds and
pension funds, have vast holdings in public corporations.  Their inter-
ests tend to be aligned with the long-term interests of companies.
Such investors oppose excessive risk-taking.  Saving millions in execu-
tive compensation would also serve the interests of these longer-term
investors.  They would be inclined to support bylaw amendments to
establish Shareholder Compensation Committees, particularly where
directors and executives had a history of extracting bloated pay from
their companies.  Mutual funds and pension funds would similarly
tend to support compensation proposals that discouraged excessive
risk-taking and that did not award exorbitant pay to executives.  Pres-
sure arising from shareholder activism, as well as the media coverage
it elicited, would also influence mutual funds and pension funds to
support bylaw changes and reasonable compensation packages.  Their
votes, along with the votes of non-institutional investors, would offset
the votes of hedge funds.
To avoid public censure, directors would not be inclined to pro-
pose plans that would encourage reckless risk-taking.  If they did pro-
pose such plans, Shareholder Compensation Committees, in their
counterproposals, would expose the objectionable parts of directors’
proposals.  Mindful of this scrutiny, directors would likely go to great
lengths to propose conservative, performance-based packages.  Thus,
the approach recommended in this Article would act as a constraint
on both the level and types of compensation that directors would pro-
pose.  If directors stubbornly insisted on ignoring their fiduciary du-
ties to their companies, they would incur the condemnation of the
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print and television media, as well as bloggers.  The potential for pub-




The proposal made in this Article would require mailing a Notice
of Election to shareholders.  Preparing, printing, and mailing costs
would be significant.416  Companies would also have to bear the added
expense of including in their proxy materials the recommendations of
the directors and those of the Shareholder Compensation Committee.
Finally, the cost of a compensation consultant to advise the Share-
holder Compensation Committee would be substantial.
b. Response
Instituting this Article’s proposal would reduce corporate ex-
penses.  The inevitable retrenchment of executive pay would more
than offset whatever additional expenses might result.  There would
be other savings.  The disclosures made by the directors and the
Shareholder Compensation Committee would obviate the need for
the CD&A and tabular disclosures required under SEC regulations.
Both the directors and Shareholder Compensation Committee would
undoubtedly provide detailed materials, but the scrutiny that each
would apply to the other’s proposals would motivate both committees
to provide more focused, better explained, and more concise disclo-
sures than those made under current SEC requirements.  Anything
less would alienate the shareholders.  SEC disclosure requirements
would become unnecessary for companies establishing Shareholder
Compensation Committees.  The SEC might therefore consider sus-
pending, or at least reducing, its disclosure requirements for compa-
nies governed by the regime proposed in this Article.  Given the
extensiveness of current SEC disclosure requirements, the proposal
made in this Article would probably diminish the burden of disclosure
on participating companies.
As with proxies, shareholders could opt for Internet disclosure of
all election and compensation-related materials.417  Electronic disclo-
sures would entail minimal expense.  Individual disclosures of candi-
416. See BROWN, supra note 328, § 10:4.3 (“In a large corporation . . . postage costs alone R
may be several hundred thousand dollars, or more, for a single mailing . . . .”).
417. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-16(j)(2) (providing that companies must, at a shareholder’s
request, furnish proxy materials via the Internet).
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dates could be limited to a manageable number of words, say, 500.
Thus, the election materials would not be lengthy or unduly expensive
to print.  Postage costs would be a worthwhile expense to enlist share-
holder participation.  Paying one additional consultant, in addition to
the lawyers, auditors, investment bankers, directors’ compensation
consultant, and celebrity spokespersons on the payroll, would not ma-




If a Shareholder Compensation Committee recommended pay
below that recommended by the directors, and if the voting share-
holders approved the lower offer, the affected Covered Individual
might refuse the offer.  That person might quit the company.  Such a
departure might deprive the company of a valued manager, and in
any event, might leave the company with a key position vacant.  The
result would be disruption of corporate operations and the collapse of
the stock price.
b. Response
Covered Individuals would be reluctant to quit their jobs unless
they had negotiated for and secured other positions.  Even if the com-
pensation offer did not satisfy a Covered Individual, he or she would
probably prefer that job to unemployment.  A dissatisfied Covered In-
dividual might begin looking for a job for the coming year, but the
directors, in their disclosures, would have informed shareholders of
this possibility.  The shareholders’ vote would indicate their willing-
ness to lose the services of that Covered Individual, perhaps because
of lackluster performance, lack of vision, or excessive risk-taking.  Fur-
thermore, as more and more shareholders took control of executive
compensation, pay levels of competitors would fall.  Fewer alternatives
for exorbitant pay would be available.
Nevertheless, some Covered Individuals might quit.  The costs to
the company, however, would not be dire.  The importance of CEOs
has been exaggerated and mythologized.  Few managers are indispen-
sable.418  Replacements could be enlisted from outside or inside the
418. See RAKESH KHURANA, SEARCHING FOR A CORPORATE SAVIOR 190 (2002) (observing
that “[d]espite the lack of a convincing link between the CEO and corporate performance,
firms continue to buy into the mythology that the key to improving long-term perform-
ance . . . is hiring an external savior”); Andhra Pradesh, Senior Management Not Indispensable,
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company.419  Large companies employ scores of talented, energetic,
mid-level and upper-level managers who scramble for the top posi-
tions in their firms.  If Covered Individuals departed precipitously,
fresh talent would replace them like air rushing into a vacuum.  If
departing managers thwarted efforts at transition, they would suffer
damage to their reputations.  Such a prospect would encourage coop-
eration.  Even if the stock price fell when a CEO left a company, once
revenues and earnings showed that the CEO was expendable, the
stock price would rebound.
The board of directors would negotiate employment contracts
with newly hired or promoted executives replacing those who chose to
leave the company.  The following year, when the new top managers
were presented with pay offers approved by shareholder vote, they
would probably not be as disposed as their predecessors to refuse
those offers.  New CEOs or CFOs would be eager to establish their
credentials as effective top managers.  In addition, the culture of the
company would have begun to change.  After only a few years, share-
holder control over pay would have become accepted, and Covered
Individuals would not be inclined to rebel.
4. Sabotage
a. Objection
Unscrupulous corporations might pay their cronies to purchase
blocks of a competitor’s stock to make them eligible to run for and to
HINDU, Apr. 24, 2005, available at http://www.hinduonnet.com/2005/04/24/stories/
2005042413710400.htm (reporting findings of the president of the Confederation of In-
dian Industry that mid-level and even low-level managers can replace senior managers with
excellent results for the firm); Carole Spiers, The Myth of Indispensability, GULF NEWS, Oct.
14, 2008 (providing examples debunking the myth that managers are indispensible); Anal-
ysis: Executive Compensation and Whether CEOs Are Worth Millions of Dollars (National Public
Radio broadcast Oct. 7, 2002), available at 2002 WLNR 13873130 (discussing executive
compensation with Rakesh Khurana, a professor at the Harvard Business School, who
stated that based on the research “it’s not clear we even have a CEO effect” on company
performance).
419. Compare Rakesh Khurana & Nitin Nohria, The Performance Consequences of CEO Turno-
ver 23–26 (Working Paper, 2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=219129 (reporting
the following empirical findings: (1) CEO turnover does not generally lead to change in
company performance; (2) the forced departure of a CEO replaced by an outsider leads to
improved company performance; and (3) the forced departure of a CEO replaced by an
insider has no effect on company performance), with Wei Shen & Albert A. Cannella, Jr.,
Revisiting the Performance Consequences of CEO Succession: The Impacts of Successor Type, Postsuc-
cession Senior Executive Turnover, and Departing CEO Tenure, 45 ACAD. MGMT. J. 717, 728–29
(2002) (finding that when inside managers replace senior executives who are forced out of
companies, firm performance improves, although performance falls when outside manag-
ers replace departing senior executives).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\69-3\MLR301.txt unknown Seq: 77 25-MAY-10 6:34
2010] TAKING STOCK—SALARY AND OPTIONS TOO 495
be elected to their rival’s Shareholder Compensation Committee.
Malcontents and crackpots, who have a sufficient stake in companies,
might serve on Shareholder Compensation Committees just to cause
havoc.
b. Response
The statute would punish bad faith conduct.  Any shareholder
whose conduct in connection with running for or serving on a Share-
holder Compensation Committee was motivated by bad faith would be
subject to both civil liability and criminal prosecution.  Any person or
corporation would be civilly and criminally responsible for knowingly
causing the inclusion of material misrepresentations or omissions in
election disclosures for the Shareholder Compensation Committee.
Individuals and corporations would be subject to civil liability and
criminal prosecution for aiding and abetting a violation.
5. Shareholder Ignorance
a. Objection
Shareholders lack the knowledge of company operations, fi-
nances, policy, and past executive performance to make intelligent
compensation decisions.  Nor do they have the expertise to fashion
complex compensation packages, which involve not only salaries, but
also more exotic forms of compensation such as options, restricted
stock, and stock appreciation rights.  Finally, they are unfamiliar with
the practices of other similarly situated companies whose compensa-
tion packages might provide valuable guidance.
b. Response
Members of the Shareholder Compensation Committee would
have disclosed their qualifications in the election process, and share-
holders would have elected them based on those disclosures.  It is
likely that at least some of the members of the Committee would have
the expertise to analyze both the materials provided to them and the
recommendations of the directors.  Even if some of the members of
the Committee lacked in-depth knowledge of executive compensation
practices, the Committee would be authorized to hire an independent
compensation consultant to provide expert advice and guidance.
Many directors, some who sit on compensation committees, are not
experts on executive compensation and rely on compensation
consultants.
As part of the process, the directors would provide the Share-
holder Compensation Committee with all the information they used
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in reaching their compensation decisions, including financial infor-
mation, performance evaluations under quantitative and qualitative
performance metrics, and benchmarking.  The directors would also
have to provide the Shareholder Compensation Committee with pro-
posed performance metrics for the coming year.  If critical of the di-
rectors’ proposals, the Shareholder Compensation Committee would
show, in its proxy disclosure, why it disagreed with the directors’ rec-
ommendations.  It would explain its proposals fully and attempt to
show why its proposals would be preferable to those of the directors.
If its arguments were incomplete, unclear, or otherwise unpersuasive,
shareholders would vote for the directors’ proposals.
Knowing that their recommendations would be scrutinized by the
Shareholder Compensation Committee, the directors would scrupu-
lously justify their proposals.  Any tendency that the directors had to-
ward making extravagant recommendations would be tempered by
the scrutiny of the Shareholder Compensation Committee and the
public reaction that the Committee’s criticisms would provoke.  The
executive-compensation tug-of-war resulting from competing propos-
als would furnish shareholders with all the information they would
need to vote intelligently.
6. Shareholder Apathy
a. Objection
Even if all relevant information were placed in front of sharehold-
ers, they would not expend the effort to analyze or even read it.  Many
would not bother to cast a vote.420  Providing shareholders with con-
trol over executive compensation would be turning the decisionmak-
ing process over to a cadre of the inattentive.  If shareholders did
exercise their vote without having analyzed the information in the
proxy materials, their decisions would be a pin-the-tail-on-the-donkey
exercise.
420. One study shows that shareholders have declined to exercise their power under
state law to amend bylaws to permit shareholders to opt out of anti-takeover restrictions.
See Yair Jason Listokin, If You Give Shareholders Power, Do They Use It?: An Empirical Analysis
2–3, 13 (Yale Law & Econ. Research, Paper No. 383, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1400263 (concluding that simply increasing shareholder power may not alter cor-
porate governance).  The author may well be correct, but the proposal made in this Article
would likely lead to action.  Shareholder interest in reducing executive compensation—an
issue of intense public concern—is probably much keener than shareholder interest in
securing the right to opt out of a takeover that may never occur.
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b. Response
Shareholder apathy is spawned by powerlessness.  If shareholders
had the clout to determine executive compensation, they would be
eager to exercise that power.  Rampant outrage suggests that share-
holders are not mired in passivity.  The reluctance of shareholders to
wade through the CD&A results from its length, lack of clarity, and
evasiveness.421  Competitive recommendations made by directors and
Shareholder Compensation Committees would have to be under-
standable and persuasive to attract the votes of shareholders.  Finally,
a prominent notice would appear on the cover of every proxy
statement:
SHAREHOLDERS HAVE A BINDING VOTE TO DETERMINE
THE COMPENSATION OF DESIGNATED EXECUTIVES
AND OF THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE BOARD.
SEE PAGES X–XX FOR MORE DETAILS.
One supposes that most shareholders would turn to page X.
7. Shareholder Meddling
a. Objection
Corporate law establishes clear roles for directors and sharehold-
ers.  Shareholders are passive investors, while directors are entrusted
with the responsibility to function as guardians.  The proposal made
in this Article would upset the balance of power.  Other proposals
might follow that would further weaken the authority of directors un-
til shareholders would have veto power over many, if not all, decisions
of management.  An erosion of managerial power would hobble cor-
porate decisionmaking and jeopardize profits.  Investors would flee
from enterprises subject to shareholder interference.
b. Response
The fiduciary approach does not adequately control executive
compensation.422  Soaring executive pay provides proof of this fail-
ure.423  Either because of conflicts of interest with or lack of commit-
ment to shareholder interests, directors have not and will not
negotiate reasonable compensation packages with CEOs and other
top executives.  Blind allegiance to a flawed system is not a solution.
421. See supra Part III.C.
422. See supra Part II.A–C.
423. See supra notes 1–19 and accompanying text. R
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The fiduciary model, however, works admirably in allocating power to
directors and officers to determine business policy and strategy.  Only
executive compensation is at issue.  No one is arguing to scrap the
broad powers of directors or managers.  No one is arguing to abandon
the business judgment rule.  This proposal seeks merely to provide the
owners of corporations—the very investors that the officers and direc-
tors represent—with the authority to avert compensation abuse.
8. Federal Intrusion
a. Objection
Over the years, the federal government has exercised more and
more authority.  During the financial crisis, the federal government
has expanded its influence by purchasing substantial equity stakes in
financial and automotive companies.  The national government is sim-
ply too powerful.  The need to contain the expansion of federal power
is particularly acute in areas such as corporate law that are generally
reserved to the states.  Congress and the SEC would be violating the
principle of federalism if they assumed power to establish rules of cor-
porate governance.424
b. Response
Exorbitant executive compensation presents a discrete and
unique problem that has worsened over the years.  The states have not
exercised their power to curb executive pay.  Given this default, the
problem of executive compensation is a legitimate area of federal con-
cern.  This Article does not propose a wholesale imposition of federal
authority over corporate law issues.  Federal regulation of this specific
area does not signal a tide of intrusion or the demise of federalism.
Individual states would not adopt corporate law that would imple-
ment the approach suggested in this Article.  To avoid losing power
over executive compensation, principals of companies would not in-
corporate in jurisdictions giving shareholders a determinative vote on
compensation packages.  Companies already incorporated in jurisdic-
tions that followed the proposal made in this Article would change
their states of incorporation.  Such a migration would induce many
states, wishing to garner corporate filing and renewal fees, to retain
424. See Yin Wilczek, Proxies: Industry Expected to Sue if SEC Adopts Proxy Access; Lawsuit Risk
Can Be Reduced, Sec. L. Daily (BNA), June 15, 2009 (pointing out that business leaders who
oppose proposed Rule 14a-11, which would increase shareholder rights to nominate candi-
dates for director positions, will argue that the proposed rule would usurp power from the
states).
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the status quo.  The only effective strategy for the adoption of the ap-
proach advocated in this Article is federal legislation with supplemen-
tary administrative regulation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Everyone wants to make more money.  Just about no one volunta-
rily turns down an extra buck.  Athletes, rock musicians, and movie
stars rake in astronomical sums.  The public views them with awe and
envy, but most people accept the verdict of the free marketplace.  The
free market, however, does not decide executive pay.  The fractured
corporate governance structure does.  Although directors are chas-
tened to be prudent with company assets, they shovel corporate funds
at managers.  Managerial power and a lack of commitment to safe-
guard someone else’s money explain this failure of corporate govern-
ance.  Shareholders are an amorphous lot.  They are a faceless,
numberless aggregation of transients who quietly trade in and out of
the corporate body politic.  Directors are more influenced by day-to-
day pressures in the boardroom than they are guided by the admoni-
tions of abstract legal principles, the interests of impersonal business
entities, or the welfare of that ineffable aggregation.
The problem is not merely one of pay without performance.  Di-
rectors could link every dollar of executive compensation—or every
ten million dollars—to performance, and pay could still be and almost
certainly would be outlandishly high.  Doing a good job does not ex-
cuse corporate looting.  The free market provides no answers because
of the failure of so many directors to negotiate efficient compensation
arrangements.  The so-called “free” market is an expensive proposi-
tion for shareholders.  Benchmarking is useless.  Pegging pay levels to
the plundering of other corporate vaults just leads to more plunder-
ing.  The only fair method is to vest in the shareholder the power to
set executive pay.
The question is how to shift this power from directors to share-
holders without disrupting the mechanisms of corporate governance.
One answer is creating a workable framework for establishing Share-
holder Compensation Committees.  Provided with all the information
available to the directors and guided by a compensation consultant,
such Committees, if dissatisfied with the directors’ proposals, would
offer alternatives.  Shareholders would no longer have to navigate
through dense, confusing, and sometimes misleading disclosures.
The directors would have an incentive to present their recommenda-
tions clearly and concisely, or they would face defeat.  The Share-
holder Compensation Committee would strive to provide both
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focused criticisms of contested proposals and understandable expla-
nations of its counterproposals.  Shareholders would determine the
compensation of the chairman of the board and the top executives
running their companies.  Stripped of millions in salary, options, and
restricted stock, those executives would not tolerate making less than
their subordinates.  The pay of lower ranking managers would
tumble.425
Countless proposals to curb executive pay are swirling through
Washington.  The public is fed up, President Obama is engaged,426
and Congress is prepared to act.  Corporate lobbyists will condemn
this proposal as an assault on big business, small business, capitalism,
freedom, and all the values that America holds dear.  The lawmakers
should rebuff them.  This is a simple matter of billions of dollars and
trillions of cents.
425. Cf. Kara Scannell, SEC Ready to Require More Pay Disclosures, WALL ST. J., June 3, 2009,
at C1 (reporting that the SEC is contemplating new disclosure requirements covering low-
ranking executives).
426. After issuing executive compensation guidelines applying to recipients of TARP
funds, President Obama deferred to Congress, which enacted even tougher restraints than
those proposed by the President. See Deborah Solomon, White House Set to Appoint a Pay
Czar, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2009, at A2 (explaining that after the Obama administration
issued guidelines for executive pay, “Congress . . . chimed in with even tougher rules”).
On June 17, 2009, President Obama unveiled a comprehensive economic regulatory plan,
which supports many of the proposals adopted in the Interim Final Rule.  Seeking to curb
excessive executive compensation, the plan proposes (1) the use of performance-related
metrics for compensation, (2) the alignment of compensation with sound risk manage-
ment, (3) the reexamination of golden parachutes and supplemental retirement packages
to achieve alignment with shareholder interests, (4) say-on-pay, and (5) the enhancement
of the independence of compensation committees and compensation consultants. DEP’T
OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM 29–30 (2009), http://www.financial-
stability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf.
